Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws:
Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax
David P. Currie
Home life as we understand it is no more natural to us than a cage is natural to a
cockatoo.
Shaw

The Australians are dead right: divorce ought to be a federal question.'
In a federal system with such extreme variations among states as we
have, on a subject of such intense concern as divorce, the situation is
one big mess. 2 This is not to suggest that the conflict of laws in general is exactly a hotbed of consistency and rationality. But the law
of migratory divorce inhabits a looking-glass world in which the usual
conflicts principles are distorted beyond recognition. Jurisdiction over
the defendant seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient to empower
a court to hear a divorce case. Foreign law is never considered, much
less applied. A foreign judgment may be collaterally attacked on the
issue of domicile, which ordinarily relates to choice of law. Jurisdiction is sustained every day on the basis of testimony that nobody
begins to believe. Litigants and lawyers freely engage in conduct that,
in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's words, "in any other type of litigation
would be regarded as perjury, but which is not so regarded where
'' It
divorce is involved because ladies and gentlemen indulge in it.
David P. Currie, Associate Professor of Law, The University of Chicago, received an A.B.
degree in 1957 from the University of Chicago and an LL.B. degree in 1960 from Harvard
University. The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Judson H. Miner of the
University of Chicago Law School, class of 1967, for a paper on which much of Part I of
this article is based, see Divorce Ex Parte Style, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 837 (1966), and for
valuable and constructive criticism.
I Matrimonial Causes Act, Act No. 104 of 1959 (Aust.).
2 See 1 RABEL, CoNFrIcr OF LAWS 421 (2d ed. 1958): "In federations that guarantee
mutual recognition of state acts between the single states, it should be presupposed that the
aims of the several legislations, varied as they may be, are not fundamentally hostile to
each other. In a Union including legislations of New York and Nevada, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause cannot work smoothly."
8 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 367 (1948) (dissenting opinion). Compare voN MEHPEN
& TRAUTIMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 1486 (1965): "Some say this allegation
[of domicile in the divorcing State] amounts to perjury; others argue that it is like those
allegations.made under the common-law forms of action that in time came to be disregarded and did not require proof-a ritual, not a matter of conscience .... " See also
PIRE, BEYOND TBE LAw 35-55 (1963), quoted in GOLDSTIN & KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE
LA w 89 (1965).

Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws
is no secret that Nevada makes divorce law for the whole country. The
Constitution is lost in the shuffle, and the law is held up to disrespect.
Recent developments have cast additional darkness into three discrete
comers of this perennially gloomy closet of the law, and each deserves
comment. Simons v. Miami Beach First National Bank4 deals with ex
parte divorce, in which the issue is the protection of the rights of the
absent spouse who is not subject to personal jurisdiction; Rosenstiel v.
Rosenstiel5 deals with the problem of the migratory consent divorce,
in which the issue is the protection of the interest of the home state in
preserving the marriage; Estate of Borax v. Commissioner6 concerns
the position of foreign divorces in determining marital status for purposes of the federal tax law, where the issue is whether the validity of
a divorce is even relevant to the decision.
I. Ex PARTE DivoRcE-Simons v. Miami Beach First NationalBank
The one who goes is happier than those he leaves behind.
Edward Pollock

Sol Simons, who had lived in New York with his wife, moved to
Florida, divorced her ex parte, and died. She filed a claim in the Florida
court, seeking dower in his Florida property under Florida law. But
the divorce was concededly valid; Florida provides dower only for a
"widow"; and the Supreme Court held the denial of her claim constitutional.7
This decision muddies the waters of ex parte divorce, whose modern
source is the first of the famous Williams decisions in 1942.8 Departing
from precedent, the Supreme Court there held that personal jurisdiction over a defendant spouse was not necessary to entitle a Nevada
divorce to full faith in other states.9 A refusal to recognize divorces
valid where granted, the Court said, would not only contravene the
language of the Constitution, it would also leave people with different
husbands or wives in different states, bastardize children, and perhaps
encourage collusive divorces.
4 381 U.S. 81 (1965).
5 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 1024 (1965).
6 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1965).
7 381 U.S. 81 (1965). A challenge to the divorce court's finding of Florida domicile was
abandoned in the Supreme Court. Id. at 83.
8 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (Williams 1).
9 Before Williams I the understanding was that full faith was required only to those
ex parte divorces granted in the state of "matrimonial domicile," and not to those granted
in a state to which the plaintiff had moved alone without changing the marital domicile.
The latter, however, were often recognized as a matter of comity. Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U.S. 562 (1905); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1900). The actual holding in
Haddock was only that the divorce need not be given effect on the issue of support. See
Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled? 18 IND. L.J. 165, 171-76 (1943).
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Given the premise of validity in the divorcing state, Williams I is
an unexceptionable application of the language and purpose of the
full faith and credit clause. But, as Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out in
dissent, the premise itself is more debatable.
Earlier decisions, it is true, had not disputed that an ex parte divorce
was valid where granted, and the Court in Williams I reaffirmed the
power of the divorcing state by stressing the latter's "rightful and
legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within
its borders."' 0 This concern is certainly a material consideration; as
the Supreme Court recognized in McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co.,"' a state's interest in the application of its law to protect its citizens goes a long way toward establishing its jurisdiction over absent
defendants in cases not concerning divorce. Indeed, it would not be
unreasonable to allow every interested state to assert jurisdiction:
because other interested states need not apply foreign law, a state may
be unable to effectuate its interest unless it can provide a forum. 12
Outside the divorce arena, however, it is simply not true that any
interested state may assert jurisdiction to affect the rights of absent
parties. The Court made clear in Hanson v. Denckla that there may be
cases in which a state could constitutionally apply its law, but cannot
assert jurisdiction. 8 The test of due process is fairness to the defendant,
and fairness is generally said to be lacking where something of value
is taken from a defendant who, like the absent spouses in Williams I,
has had no contacts with the forum state.14 The Court in Williams I
made no mention of this well-established principle, and the consequence was Mr. Justice Jackson's anguished protest that under the
Court's holding, "settled family relationships may be destroyed by a
procedure that we would not recognize if the suit were one to collect
a grocery bill.""'
In Estin v. Estin,'6 however, the Court held that an ex parte Nevada
10 317 U.S. at 298.
11 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
12 See van Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1130, 1176-77 (1966); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 925 (1960).
13 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). See D. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Personal Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILr. LF. 533, 558.
14 See generally D. Currie, supra note 13, and cases cited therein.
15 317 U.S. at 316 (dissenting opinion). See Mayers, Ex Parte Divorce: A Proposed Federal
Remedy, 54 CoLuM L. REv. 54 (1954); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction,
73 HARv. L. Rxv. 909, 971-75 (1960).
16 334 U.S. 541, 546-48 (1948); accord, Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948). This
result was foreshadowed by concurring opinions in Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279, 281, 283 (1945), where the majority upheld a refusal to recognize
the divorce itself for lack of jurisdiction.
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divorce could not extinguish the absent wife's right to support under
a prior decree. Williams I, the Court explained, was justified by Nevada's interest in the marital status of its domiciliaries; but New York,
the wife's domicile in Estin, "was rightly concerned lest the abandoned
spouse be left impoverished and perhaps become a public charge." The
prior judgment created a "property interest" that could not be destroyed without personal jurisdiction over her. In the later Vanderbilt case the Court reached a similar result, although the support
obligation had not been reduced to judgment before the divorce. 17
And in May v. Anderson the Court extended Estin to child custody: Ohio was not required to respect a Wisconsin ex parte judgment giving custody to the father because "a mother's right to custody
of her children is a personal right entitled to at least as much protection
as her right to alimony."' 8
The Williams I opinion must be criticized for ignoring the problem
of fairness to the absent spouse. The result, however, can be respectably
defended. The ultimate question under the due process clause is
whether the assertion of jurisdiction is in accord with "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."'19 The balance of fairness
must be affected not only by the strength of the interest of the state in
providing a forum, which the Court stressed in Williams I, but also
by the degree of injury to the absent defendant. In the light of Estin,
Vanderbilt,and May, it is arguable that the absent spouses in Williams I
were not injured by the Nevada divorces. Their rights to claim custody
or support were unaffected, and their "marriages" existed in name only;
divorce or no, the state does not force unwilling people to live together.
Thus, the divorces served Nevada's interest in freeing the Nevada
spouses from impediments to remarriage, and arguably did not inflict
20
substantial harm on the stay-at-home defendants.
17 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957). This position had been taken by
four Justices in the earlier Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 575-81 (1956), where the
majority held the divorce decree did not purport to affect alimony.
18 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953).
19 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
20 Cf. D. Currie, The Multiple Personality of the Dead: Executors, Administrators, and
the Conflict of Laws, 33 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 429, 434-35, 450 & n.100 (1966). It has been argued
that some spouses may value the marital status more highly than the right to support, see
Drinan, What Are the Rights of an Involuntary Divorcee? 53 Ky. L.J. 209, 214 (1965),
and it is also arguable that the availability of Nevada divorce injures the defendant
spouse by ameliorating the pressures exerted by strict divorce laws to induce people to try
making the best of the match. But the Supreme Court's assessment of the interests, and the
consequent doctrine of "divisible" divorce, have many defenders. E.g., GOODRicH, CONFLiCr
oF LAws 411, 432-33 (3d ed. 1949); Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled? 18 IND. L.J.
165, 177-82 (1943); Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 FIv. L. Rxv. 930, 955 (1945).
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Simons, however, upsets the applecart, for it permits a state to inflict
serious financial loss on absent spouses with whom it has no contacts.
Mr. Justice Harlan, who concurred, viewed the decision as a "withdrawal" from Vanderbilt;21 Justices Black and Douglas, who also concurred, believed that Vanderbilt was distinguishable. 22 The Court was
awake to the issue, for Mrs. Simons had argued that her claim to a share
of her husband's estate, like a claim for alimony, was protected by Vanderbilt.To describe the Court's disposition of the question as "brusque"
is to put it mildly. Here it is in full:
Insofar as petitioner argues that since she was not subject
to the jurisdiction of the Florida divorce court its decree
could not extinguish any dower right existing under Florida
law, Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418, the answer
is that under Florida law no dower right survived the decree.
The Supreme Court of Florida has said that dower rights in
Florida property, being inchoate, are extinguished by a divorce decree predicated upon substituted or constructive
service. Pawley v. Pawley, Fla., 46 So. 2d 464.
This was buttressed by a footnote quotation from Pawley purporting
23
to distinguish dower from alimony.
The Court's conclusion that Florida could constitutionally extin21 381 U.S. at 86-88. Mr. Justice Harlan conceded that the result in Vanderbilt could be
defended if a right to alimony were given by the law of the wife's domicile at the time of
divorce, but objected to Vanderbilt insofar as it suggested that: "(1) an ex parte divorce can
have no effect on property rights; (2) a state in which a wife subsequently establishes
domicile can award support to her regardless of her connection with the state at the time
of the ex parte divorce and regardless of the law in her former State of domicile." Id.
at 87 & n.2. He had dissented in Vanderbilt on the same grounds. 354 U.S. at 428.
22 381 U.S. at 88. Justices Stewart and Goldberg, dissenting, argued that the only
issues in the case concerned state law, and therefore that the writ should be dismissed as
improvidently granted.
23 Id. at 85 & n.6: "In this, if not in every jurisdiction, right of dower can never be made
the subject of a wholly independent issue in any divorce suit. It stands or falls as a result of
the decree which denies or grants divorce. It arises upon marriage, as an institution of the
law. The inchoate right of dower has some of the incidents of property. It partakes of the
nature of a lien or encumbrance. It is not a right which is originated by or is derived from
the husband; nor is it a personal obligation to be met or fulfilled by him, but it is a
creature of the law, is born at the marriage altar, cradled in the bosom of the marital
status as an integral and component part thereof, survives during the life of the wife as
such and finds its sepulcher in divorce. Alimony too is an institution of the law but it is a
personal obligation of the husband which is based upon the duty imposed upon him by the
common law to support his wife and gives rise to a personal right of the wife to insist
upon, if she be entitled to, it. It has none of the incidents of, and is in no sense a lien
upon or interest in, property. Consequently, the right of the wife to be heard on the
question of alimony should not, indeed lawfully it cannot, be destroyed by a divorce decree
sought and secured by the husband in an action wherein only constructive service of
process was effected."
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guish Mrs. Simons' right because Florida had extinguished it sounds
remarkably question begging: presumably Florida is not the ultimate
judge of its constitutional powers. Yet there are several important
factual differences between Simons and Vanderbilt, which I shall
explore individually in an attempt to determine the impact and correctness of Simons. Unlike Vanderbilt, Simons concerned (1) a claim
that the state did not wish to recognize; (2) a claim under the laws of
the divorcing state; (3) a claim in the courts of the divorcing state;
(4) a claim for an estate share instead of for alimony; and (5) a claim
to property located in the divorcing state.
A. Overridingthe State Law
The Court's statement that Mrs. Simons' right did not survive under
Florida law, together with the quoted remark of the Florida court
that dower "stands or falls as a result of the decree which denies or
grants divorce," 24 points to an important distinction suggested by the
Estin opinion 25 and by no means confined to cases of dower. Estin,
Vanderbilt, and May held that a state was permitted to grant relief
despite a valid ex parte divorce; Mrs. Simons argued that the state
was required to do so. 26 The supreme court of Oregon has interpreted
Estin as leaving the states free to grant or deny alimony as a matter
of their own law, 27 and considerable support for this view is found
in Estin's emphasis on the interest of the wife's state in providing for
her support. 28 If the issue is one of conflicting state interests, it is
certainly material that the state disclaims any interest in granting what
the wife requests.
On the other hand, the language of Estin, May, and Vanderbilt is
24 Ibid.
2'5 334 U.S. at 544. The husband had argued that a divorce terminated the right to
support as a matter of New York law. The Court did not pass on this contention because
"the highest court in New York has held in this case that a support order can survive
divorce ....
" Ibid.
26 This seems the main thrust of Justices Black and Douglas' concurrence: "Mrs. Simons'
Florida dower was not terminated by the ex parte divorce. It simply never came into
existence ....
She simply had her marriage ended by it [the divorce], and for that reason
was not a 'widow' within the meaning of the Florida law." 381 U.S. at 88-89.
27 Rodda v. Rodda, 185 Ore. 140, 149, 200 P.2d 616, 620 (1949). This view is widely

shared. See, e.g., EmENzwEo, CONFLiCr OF LAws 266 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLiCr OF LAWs § 116, comment g (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953); Paulsen, Migratory Divorce:
Chapters III and IV, 24 IND. L.J. 25, 49, 50 (1948); Note, Divisible Divorce, 76 HA~v. L. REv.
1233, 1238 (1963); 12 STAN. L. Rnv. 848, 849 (1960); 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 142, 145
(1961). But see Bassett v. Bassett, 141 F.2d 954, 955 (9th Cir. 1944), holding without discussion of the law of the alimony state that a prior support judgment "could not be
set aside or affected by a judgment of a court of another state."
28 334 U.S. at 547.
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broad enough to prohibit a state from voluntarily giving support or
custody effect to an ex parte decree. "[W]e are aware," the Court said
in Estin, "of no power which the state of domicile of the debtor has
to determine the personal rights of the creditor in the intangible unless
the creditor has been personally served or appears in the proceeding." 29
In neither Vanderbilt nor May was the state's interest in giving relief
even mentioned; the Court's whole argument was that valuable rights
cannot be terminated by a court lacking personal jurisdiction.3 0
Professor Morris has argued, however, that Estin leaves a state free
to deny support on the basis of an ex parte divorce. In a state whose
law provides that such a divorce terminates the right to support, he
urges, a support order gives:
not an absolute but a terminable property right, terminable,
that is, on divorce. When the divorce occurred, no property
was taken away from her; all that happened was that the condition subsequent took effect.3 1
But to say there has been no taking away of property seems a mere
form of words. It is sometimes proper to condition the grant of a
privilege upon surrender of a right that cannot be taken away directly,
but this should be so only if granting the privilege enhances the state's
interest in denying the right.3

2

The interest in requiring disclosure

of associations or beliefs, for example, increases if one is to be given
access to military secrets. But this is not the case in Professor Morris'
example. Calling alimony a terminable privilege in no way gives the
state a greater interest than it would have in authorizing suit to extinguish it in an inconvenient forum. Professor Morris' thesis would
29 Id. at 548.

30 354 U.S. at 418-19; 345 U.S. at 533-34. No particular significance should be attached
to the Court's explicit statement in Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. at 419, or to its clear implications
in Estin and May, that the reason full faith was not required was because the decrees were
"void" as to support or custody. Voluntary recognition of a void decree, it is true, would
deny due process; but the question remains whether the Court would have held the
decrees void as to these matters if the state had made clear it had no interest in granting
relief.
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in May, 345 U.S. at 536-42, thought the Court was holding
Ohio prohibited from recognizing a Wisconsin custody decree because of lack of personal
jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, 345 U.S. at 535-36, thought the decision
left Ohio free to do as it pleased and applauded that result. The Court said that Ohio
had felt itself "obliged" to accept the decree, and that the question was whether Ohio
"must" give the decree full credit.
31 Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 HARV.L. Rav. 1287, 1296 (1951); accord, Paulsen, Support
Rights and an Out-of-State Divorce, 38 MINN. L. REv. 709, 712-13 (1954).
32 See French, UnconstitutionalConditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234, 247-48 (1961)
(semble); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. Rv. 1595, 1600-02 (1960). If the
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permit a state completely to avoid the requirement of personal jurisdiction by simply declaring all rights given by its laws "terminable"
upon the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction.
The harsh fact is that the termination of the payment of support
money inflicts substantial injury, and the unfairness of doing this on
the basis of the decree of a court lacking contacts with the victim is not
mitigated by the fact that the injury is inflicted by someone other than
the divorcing court.33 "[D]ue process," the Supreme Court has held,
"requires that no other jurisdiction shall give effect, even as a matter
of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without due process."3 4
If this argument is sound, it should not matter that Mrs. Simons
sought relief in the divorcing state and under its laws. The gist of her
complaint was the unfairness of giving financial effect to the ex parte
proceeding, and it seems no less unfair for Florida than for New York
to give the proceeding that effect.
B. "Dower" and Alimony
Mrs. Vanderbilt sued for alimony; Mrs. Simons for "dower." The
Court apparently believed this difference important, for it quoted a
passage from a Florida decision purporting to find several distinctions
between alimony and dower. Dower, the Florida court said, is inchoate;
it stands or falls with the divorce decree; it can never be claimed in
a divorce suit; and it has some of the incidents of property. Alimony,
on the other hand, is a personal right of the wife and a personal obligation of the husband, based on his duty of support.35
That dower "stands or falls" with the divorce itself suggests the
point discussed above; namely, that it matters whether the state wishes
problem is one of unconstitutional conditions, a more traditional formulation might suggest
that it is permissible to make a right terminable on the entry of a void decree if this
condition serves the legitimate purpose of avoiding complexity in administering the law.
Cf. Comment, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. CHI. L. R v. 331,
341-42 (1966), discussing Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). But if the doctrine
of conditions is not to permit the destruction of important rights by changes in
nomenclature, the purpose served must be one not so strongly applicable to a direct
abolition of the claimed right. And the effort saved by eliminating collateral attack is
insufficient to justify dispensing with the requirement of personal jurisdiction directly.
33 Accord, GOODaIC, CONFLICT OF LAws 266, 275, 280 (4th ed. Scoles 1964); Note, 48
CAuLF. L. REv. 303, 310-11 (1960); cf. Huber v. Huber, 26 Misc. 2d 539, 541-42, 209 N.Y.S.2d
637, 641 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (tenancy by the entireties-alternative holding).
84 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 229 (1946), refusing to allow the District of Columbia
to grant alimony on the basis of a New York decree rendered without notice.
35 Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464, 472-73 & n.2 (1950), quoted at 381 U.S. 85 n.6. The
holding in Pawley was that alimony, "perhaps unlike the inchoate right of dower"
(emphasis in original) could not be denied on the basis of an ex parte divorce. Dower was
not in issue.
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to recognize the claim or not. The distinction between "personal"
and "property" rights will be taken up later.36 It is no distinction that
alimony's purpose is the wife's support; the same is true of dower
both in its common law form and in the modified version Mrs. Simons
sought under Florida law.37 Two possible distinctions remain for discussion here: that dower is "inchoate" and that it cannot be claimed
in a divorce suit.
1. The "Inchoate" Nature of the Claim. Mrs. Simons' claim at the
time of the divorce was certainly inchoate. A wife's enjoyment of
common law dower was contingent upon her surviving her husband; 38
Mrs. Simons' claim for personal property under the Florida statute
was also contingent upon his owning personalty when he died, for
Florida gives a wife no interest in personal property conveyed during
her marriage. 39 Mrs. Simons lacked even an inchoate interest in
specific assets. Despite the label "dower," the Florida statute in fact
entitled the wife to a statutory share of her husband's estate; thus, Mrs.
Simons' position at the time of the divorce was essentially that of an
heir apparent.
The Court's reliance on the inchoateness of Mrs. Simons' claim suggests that at the time of the divorce she had no "property" within the
meaning of the due process clause. Some judicial and scholarly language
would support such an argument. A Rhode Island court was quite
explicit: "[A] mere expectancy or possibility, as that of an heir at law
or heir in tail, while the ancestor is still living, or that of the husband
or wife, as to curtesy or dower, before the death of the other party...
does not constitute property within the meaning of the constitutional
claim could be destroyed
provisions. ' 40 If this is true, Mrs. Simons'
41
procedure.
fair
of
semblance
no
with
36

See text accompanying notes 38-55 infra.

See Adams v. Adams, 147 Fla. 267, 271-72, 2 So. 2d 855, 857 (1941); 1 AMERICAN LAW
PROPERTY § 5.3 (Casner ed. 1952). To the extent that Vanderbilt and Estin are based
upon a state's interest in providing for a wife's support after divorce, it seems immaterial
whether the husband is alive or dead, and thus this argument is no ground for holding a
state less free to grant dower than alimony in these cases.
38 See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 5.31. (Casner ed. 1952).
39 "Whenever the widow of any decedent shall not be satisfied with the portion of the
estate of her husband to which she is entitled under the law of descent and distribution
or under the will of her husband, or both, she may elect in the manner provided by law
to take dower, which dower shall be one third in fee simple of the real property which
was owned by her husband at the time of his death or which he had before the time of his
death or which he had before conveyed, whereof she had not relinquished her right of
dower as provided by law, and one third part absolutely of the personal property owned
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.34 (1964).
by her husband at the time of his death ......
40 Green v. Edwards, 31 R.I. 1, 24, 77 At. 188, 197 (1910) (dictum). See also 2 CooLtY,
CONSTrTTONAL LIMITATIONs 752 (8th ed. 1927).
41 See Krauskopf, Divisible Divorce and Rights to Support, Property and Custody, 24
37

OF
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But that would be a monstrous conclusion. That Mrs. Simons' claim
was an expectancy does not mean it was without value; she is a third
42
of a million dollars poorer as a result of the Supreme Court's decision
I find no warrant for construing "property"-in a clause embodying a
basic principle of fair dealing-so narrowly as to exclude valuable
rights simply because they are inchoate. The statements that expectancies are not "property" were made in quite another context, that
of the legislature's power to change the laws of descent or of dower
without regard for the claims of existent spouses or heirs apparent. 43
That power can be amply justified without holding that expectancies
are not property: property rights are not immune from a state's legislation designed "to safeguard the vital interests of its people." 44 The
remoteness of a claim is relevant to the balance between public need
and private right, but that is not to say that a remote claim may be
cut off arbitrarily and without a showing of need.
Nor does it follow that, because an expectancy may be extinguished
by general legislation, it may also be destroyed in an unfair judicial
proceeding. The right or "privilege" of selling liquor, even that which
has already been manufactured, may be denied to everyone in the
interest of public health, safety, or morals; 45 yet the Fifth Circuit has
recently held that an individual liquor license cannot constitutionally
be denied without a hearing.46 The policy considerations of stamping
out an entire evil, of equal treatment, and of administrative conOmo ST. L.J. 346, 355-56 (1963), arguing that expectancies of inheritance or of future
pension payments are not recognized as property and thus "unquestionably disappear with
the end of the marriage." As for dower and curtesy, which she describes as "similar," Miss
Krauskopf would permit the state of situs to terminate them or not as it sees fit after an
ex parte divorce, though she doubts the power of the divorcing state itself to affect these
rights directly. But this seems inconsistent. If inchoate dower is not "property," there is
no reason why the foreign decree cannot affect it; full faith to the valid decree would
appear to preclude another state from granting dower even if it chose to.
42 See Petition for Certiorari, p. 14.
43 See, e.g., upholding such statutes, Randall v. Krieger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137 (1875)
(dower); Ostrander v. Preece, 129 Ohio St. 625, 196 N.E. 670 (1935) (heirship).
44 E.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939) (option to elect among
currencies for bond payment); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434-48
(1934) (mortgage moratorium) (alternative holding); see Armstrong, "Prospective" Application of Changes in Community Property Control-Rule of Property or Constitutional
Necessity?, 33 CALIF. L. REy. 476, 495-96 (1945), relied on in Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal.
2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965) (quasi community property).
45 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
46 Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 609, adhered to on rehearing, 330 F.2d 55 (1964).
See 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TRE ATisE § 7.19 (Supp. 1965). By no means all courts are
so perceptive. See, e.g., Michael v. Town of Logan, 247 Iowa 574, 73 N.W.2d 714 (1955). For
general discussion of the problem of due process and "privileges" in licensing, see
Comment, The Use and Misuse of the Right-Privilege Distinction in License Revocation:
What's So Hot About Cosmetology SchooL', 31 U. CmI. L. Rv.577 (1964).
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venience, which justify impairment of existing interests by general
legislation, are simply not present when an individual is treated
47
arbitrarily.
This is not to suggest that every prospective heir is entitled to a
hearing in every suit against his ancestor, on the ground that depriving
the ancestor of property may injure him in the future. As in Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank,48 the possible contingent beneficiaries or
heirs apparent may be so numerous or so difficult to ferret out, or
their interests so remote, that a requirement that each be notified and
allowed to defend his interest would greatly impede the administration
of justice. Moreover, when the ancestor is sued it can usually be assumed
that his own self-interest will assure more or less adequate representation of the heirs apparent. 49 This was hardly the case, however, in
Simons. It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would permit a
state to dispense with notice if a man sued simply to extinguish his
wife's expectancy of a statutory share in his estate. If the Court would
not, it must be that the expectancy is property protected by the fairtrial requirements of due process; and one of those requirements is
that ordinarily one cannot be deprived of something of value without
some connection with the forum state.
47 "The potential social undesirability of the product may warrant absolutely prohibiting it, or. . . imposing restrictions to protect the community from its harmful influences. But the dangers do not justify depriving those who deal in liquor, or seek to
deal in it, of the customary constitutional safeguards." Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605,
609 (5th Cir. 1964). There are cases holding that serious consequences may be judicially or
administratively imposed upon individuals without a full hearing. In addition to the
licensing cases, supra note 46, see, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953) (exclusion of entering alien); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)
(sentencing); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (revocation of parole), criticized
in 1 DAvis, ADmINISTRATIvE LAw TREArIsE § 7.16 (Supp. 1965). But cf. Fleenor v. Hammond,
116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir. 1941) (conditional pardon cannot be revoked without hearing).
Professor Davis, giving as examples executive pardons and the discharge of cabinet officers,
suggests there is a place for a doctrine of "privileges" that can be denied without traditional
procedures; he would limit this to matters involving "clearly an act of grace" wherein the
matter is "altogether committed" to a branch of government other than the courts. 1
DAvis, ADMINIsTRATivE LAw TREATIsE §§ 7.11, 7.20, especially at 454, 507-08 (1958). Destruction of a wife's expectancy cannot be defended on this ground, nor by an argument stressing
the necessity for broad discretion as perhaps in sentencing or parole. The Mezei case is
quite intolerable, but it is no more closely in point than the solid authority holding that
aliens already in this country are entitled to due process. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
48 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
49 This seems adequate to explain such decisions as Long v. Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 124
N.E. 161, (1919), and Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Ohio St. 547 (1856), holding that a wife with
inchoate dower need not be made a party to suits to condemn or to partition her
husband's land. Both these reasons are given to justify the doctrine of "virtual representation" of unascertained owners of future interests. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 4.85,
4.89 (Casner ed. 1952).
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Finally, to deny Mrs. Simons' claim because her interest was not
"property" would produce some glaring anomalies. A wife claiming a
survivor's right to community property acquired during marriage, or to
property held in fee in tenancy by the entireties, would presumably be
protected, for both such estates are said to be present and vested. 50
Yet the differences between such estates and the statutory widow's portion or dower are not conspicuously relevant. In essence the California
wife is entitled to take a share of her husband's earnings on the latter's
death or divorce, and to dispose of a portion of those earnings by will.
Like the wife with an expectancy of an estate share, she has no right
of present enjoyment; except for the requirement of her consent to
transfers of realty or home furnishings and to gifts in general, the
property is under the husband's complete control. 51 These limitations
are not dissimilar in essence to the common law protection of the wife's
52
dower in real estate conveyed without her consent during marriage;
and that the community wife in addition is given what amounts to a
general testamentary power of appointment 3 does not seem especially
material to the question whether she may be deprived of the quite
distinct right of survivorship without a fair trial. As for the tenant
by the entireties, it is true that the married women's statutes in a
54
number of states have given the wife a present right of enjoyment;
but that right could be protected without holding, as a New York
court did in Huber v. Huber, that an ex parte divorce does not transform a tenancy by the entireties into a tenancy in common. 55 The court
in Huber was correct in protecting a spouse's right to succeed to the
entire estate on his mate's death, but not because his interest was vested.
Rather, it was correct because, as in Simons, there was no constitutional
justification for depriving the absent spouse of a valuable claim without
a fair hearing.
2. The Argument that Dower Cannot Be Claimed at Divorce.
"Dower," said the Florida court in Pawley, "can never be made the
subject of a wholly independent issue in any divorce suit."56 Mesdames
50 See, e.g., Huber v. Huber, 26 Misc. 2d 539, 541, 209 N.Y.S.2d 637, 641 (Sup. Ct. 1960);

16(a); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 6.6 (community property), 7.20
(entireties) (Casner ed. 1952). See also Keenan v. Keenan, 40 Nev. 351, 164 Pac. 351 (1917),
refusing to partition community property on the basis of an ex parte Idaho divorce.
51 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 146, 172, 172a, 201.
52 After the husband's death the wife may recover half of an unconsented gift of community property. Trimble v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340, 26 P.2d 477 (1933); cf. I AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.31, 5.32 (Casner ed. 1952) (dower).
53 She lacks even that in New Mexico. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-8 (1953).
54 See 2 AMmucAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952).
55 26 Misc. 2d 539, 209 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1960); accord, Anello v. Anello, 22 App.
Div. 2d 694, 253 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1964).
56 46 So. 2d at 472 n.2, quoted at 381 U.S. 85 n.6.
CAL. CIv. CODE §
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Estin, May, and Vanderbilt were protected because it was unfair to
make them argue for support or custody in a forum with which they
had insufficient contacts; but Mrs. Simons, it might be argued, could
not complain since she could not have got dower even if she had
appeared. Nor could she contend, as could the earlier plaintiffs, that
it was unfair to require her to submit her claim under the law of the
divorcing state; for Mrs. Simons in the post-divorce proceeding chose
to make a claim under that law. In short, she was not disadvantaged
because of the remoteness of the divorce court, and there is no warrant
in the decisions for placing her in a more advantageous position than
a wife who was subject to personal jurisdiction.
If this argument holds water, it casts additional doubts on the already
questionable decision in Williams I. The only plausible justification
for Williams I-short of a reconstruction of the whole law of personal
jurisdiction-is the argument that a spouse whose property and custody rights are protected loses nothing by an ex parte divorce. Simons,
by holding that the divorce may destroy the wife's right to a share of
her husband's estate, knocks the props from under this justification.
But the argument that Mrs. Simons was not disadvantaged by the
Jack of personal jurisdiction is fallacious. Her lack of contacts deprived
her of a fair chance to protect her interest by opposing the divorce
itself, and she should have the right to challenge the divorce as it
relates to inheritance or dower in a later proceeding. Arguably, this
should be the limit of her right: to grant her an estate share despite
a holding that the divorce was valid would put her in a better position
than if she had been subject to personal jurisdiction. But the proper
standard of comparison is not a Florida wife; rather, it is a New York
wife over whom Florida has no jurisdiction. For the Florida suit disadvantaged Mrs. Simons not only by making it inconvenient for her
to contest-the divorce, but also by subjecting her to Florida divorce
law. In the absence of Florida's jurisdiction, she could have preserved
her Florida dower simply by remaining in New York, unless her husband could have divorced her there on the then sole ground of
adultery. 57 It may be fair for Florida to take jurisdiction, as in Williams I, for the single purpose of allowing remarriage. But it is decidedly unfair for it to do so as regards inheritance.
C. Florida Assets: Jurisdiction in Rem?
The property in which Mrs. Simons sought "dower" was intangible
57 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 313, § 7, since amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254,

§§ 2-5,

to include additional grounds. N.Y. Dom. R.L. LAw §§ 170-77. The Florida divorce
was apparently granted on the ground of cruelty. See Petition for Certiorari, pp. 3, A5.
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property said to be located in Florida.5 This suggests that Florida
may have had power to cut off her interest in it even without personal
jurisdiction over her and even if her claim is "property" within the
due process clause. The black letters tell us that a state has jurisdiction
"'in rem," without regard to the contacts of interested persons, to dispose of property within its borders-to foreclose liens and mortgages,
to escheat, to cancel or reform deeds, to remove clouds or quiet titles.5 9
Having jurisdiction over all Mr. Simons' property, one can argue, Florida had power to extinguish the claims' of Mrs. Simons or of anyone
else to it, just as it has power to determine the rights of absent beneficiaries or creditors in estate or insolvency proceedings concerning
local property.6 0
On the other hand, it is equally well established that the presence
of property does not give a state power to extinguish "personal" claims
against an individual without jurisdiction over the creditor. The much
criticized Dunlevy case held that a debtor could not interplead rival
claimants to a fund within the state without personal jurisdiction,
because interpleader was a proceeding in personam rather thai in
rem; 61 in Estin v. Estin the Court held that Nevada could not-terminate
a wife's claim for alimony under a prior judgment because her claim
was in personam and personal jurisdiction was required.6 2
Thus, the test has often been a mechanical one: claims to local property may be cut off without personal jurisdiction; claims against the
individual debtor may not. But Mrs. Simons' claim is not easy to categorize. It is not a claim for a sum of money as such, being tied to the
husband's property as a measure and a source; however, she has no
claim to individual pieces of property, and all may be transferred
before death at the expense of her interest. Commentators have pointed
to the conceptual impossibility of distinguishing between interpleader
and foreign attachment in terms of actions in rem and in personam.0
It seems to me Mrs. Simons' claim could similarly be fitted into either
category in order to explain a desired result.
But the talismanic labels "in rem" and "in personam" are rapidly
58 See Petition for Certiorari, p. 14; Brief for Respondent, p. 2.
59 See Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890); 1 BEALE, CONFLir OF LAWS 435-49 (1935);
GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAWS 102-04 (4th ed. Scoles 1964); REsrATEmENT (SECOND),
CoNFLucr OF LAws §§ 101, 102 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
60 See GOODRICH, supra note 59, at 349.
61 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 .U.S. 518 (1916).
62 334 U.S. 541, 548-49 (1948).
63 See, e.g., Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
241, 268, 278-81; Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARy. L. REv.
909, 957-60 (1960).
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giving way to a general test of fairness in terms of state interests and
minimum contacts with interested parties.8 4 Much of the traditional in
rem jurisdiction can still pass muster under such an approach. Many
of the modern long arm statutes provide for jurisdiction "in personam"
over nonresidents in actions arising out of the ownership of property
in the state, and this can often be justified by the interest of the state
in affording a forum for the application of its laws and by the defendant's voluntary association with the state via owning property
there.8 5 The "in rem" label is not necessary to justify jurisdiction to
extinguish the claims of nonresidents to local land in, for example,
suits to partition or escheat, to foreclose mortgages, to sell for unpaid
taxes, or to remove clouds from title. 6 Therefore, if Mrs. Simons had
claimed an interest in particular Florida land as a tenant in common,
Mr. Simons could have cut it off by a Florida suit to quiet or remove
a cloud from title under not only an in rem classification, but also a
test of fairness. But the actual case was different in two respects: she
claimed no particular asset, and the property was intangible.
Now it is true that jurisdiction in rem is said to extend to personal
as well as to real property, and that intangibles may be included 7
64 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950);
Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 538, 346-48, 316 P.2d 960, 966 (1957); D. Currie,
Executors, Administrators, and the Conflict of Laws, 33 U. Cm. L. Rav. 429, 448-49 (1966);
Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 1121, 1135-36, 1164-66 (1966); authorities cited note 63 supra. The principal fly in
the ointment is the unfortunate Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), which makes a
point of discussing jurisdiction in rem and in personam quite separately.
65 E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1963). See D. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm:
Eight Years of Extended PersonalJurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 579-80.
66 However, the common practice of foreign attachment to satisfy debts unconnected to
the use or ownership of local property or to activities in the state is open to serious
question. In the first place, it is likely that the state's interest in applying its law, an
important predicate for its taking the case, is lacking; second, notions of fair play suggest
a limit to the risk one should be said to have assumed by undertaking the obligations of
property ownership. As a state may exact taxes on local but not on foreign activities as
a cost of doing local business, see Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910);
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAv. L. R.v. 1595, 1605-09 (1960), so it seems fair
that it may assert judicial power over local but not over foreign 'activities as a cost of
owning local assets. Cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952),
holding that more local business is required to subject a foreign corporation to suit on a
cause of action unrelated to its local business than 'on-one arising therefrom. See D.
Currie, supra note 65, at 584.
67 See GOODRICH, CONFICr OF LAws 104-06 (general), 351-57 (decedent's estate) (4th 'ed.
Scoles 1964). The Restatement Second takes an apparently somewhat restricted view of this
jurisdiction over intangibles. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND),

CONFLICr OF LAws

§§ 98, 103

(document), 104 (corporate share), 108 (garnishment of debtor, see Harris v. Balk, '198 U.S.
215 (1905)) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957). See also von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction
to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. Rav. 1121, 1157 (1966).
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(assuming the troublesome problems of locating them have been surmounted). 68 But at least we are out from under the umbrella of the
land taboo and the complex of interests, real or imagined, which surrounds the problems of land in the conflict of laws. 69 Moreover, in
dealing with personal property one is confronted with an interesting
exception to the traditional in rem theory: a state ordinarily "does
not exercise judicial jurisdiction over a chattel brought into its territory without the consent of the owner." 70 Although Professor Beale
was shouted down in asserting that it is jurisdictional, 71 this exception
is a rudimentary expression of that doctrine of fair play which is now
basic to the question of judicial power. The state's interest in determining title to or disposing of local property7 2 is not necessarily
enough; it is generally also essential, as the Supreme Court said in
Hanson v. Denckla, "that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state ....

,,73 It is one thing to cut off a claimant who has

voluntarily sent property into the state-or to sue him there for tort if
it explodes after he sends it; it is another to take his property away
if he had nothing to do with its going there. The long arm statutes
sometimes make this distinction explicit in dealing with injuries suffered in the forum state from activities elsewhere: there is jurisdiction
only if there was a reasonable expectation that the offending article
would reach the forum state.74
08 The possibility of multiple liability arising from conflicting determinations of situs,
and therefore of jurisdiction, led the Supreme Court to invalidate an attempted escheat of
intangibles in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961). But Mrs.
Simons apparently did not challenge the Florida situs of her husband's property. See Brief

for Respondent, p. 2.
69 See generally Hancock, Equitable Conversion and the Land Taboo in Conflict
of Laws, 17 STAN. L. Ray. 1095 (1965). Specifically, we are insulated from any argument
that the situs must have jurisdiction because other states are precluded from determining
title to foreign land by the lamentable "local action" rule, to which the Supreme Court has
given recent and entirely unnecessary support. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115
(1963) (dictum); B. Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for
Congress, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 89, 108.
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, comment g (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957).
71 See Weissman v. Banque de Bruxelles, 254 N.Y. 488, 173 N.E. 835 (1930) (dictum); 1
B-ALE, CONFUCT OF LAWS 299-300, 441 (1935). Contra, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 70,
§ 98, comment g; Note, The Power of a State to Affect Title in a Chattel Atypically
Removed to It, 47 COLUm. L. RiEv. 767, 771-73 (1947), and authorities cited.
72

See Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 315, 321 (1890); Note, supra note 71, 47 COLuM. L.

REv.

at 773.
73 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
74 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(3) (1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05(4)(6) (Supp. 1963).
See also People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957), applying
the same principle of reasonable expectations in the closely analogous area of choice of
law. See generally D. Currie, supra note 65, at 548-51.
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This distinction is directly relevant -to Mrs. Simons' case. Had she
lived with her husband in Florida, or taken her property there, she
would have, in the Supreme Court's language, voluntarily taken advantage of the privilege of conducting activities there, and it would
have been fair to subject her to any suit arising out of her activities
or the presence of her property there. But that was not shown to be
the case. For all that appears, Mrs. Simons, like the owner of a car
that has been stolen and taken to another state, never associated herself
with Florida at all. Her husband went to Florida alone, apparently
taking the property with him. 75 The Hanson test of fairness to nonresidents was not met, and the fact that the suit could be said to
concern a right to property in Florida does not seem to me to mitigate
the unfairness of subjecting her to suit there to take away her interest.
Therefore, even if Mrs. Simons' claim, like traditional dower, constituted a restraint on the alienability of specific assets, Florida's interest
in facilitating transferability could have been amply served by an
action in New York, and the fairness of suing her in Florida would have
appeared dubious. And because Mrs. Simons had no claim to particular assets, even that interest was lacking. Her husband's power to
dispose of his Florida property was complete; the only risk was, as in
the case of alimony, that, if the claim were not extinguished, he or his
estate might later be made. poorer. The Supreme Court in Estin held
that this was no reason for excusing the requirement of an absent
claimant's contact with the forum state 7 6 and it is no better reason
here.
There are cases in which a state may fairly extinguish claims of
absent persons with no contacts-for example, estate proceedings and
insolvency. It is clear enough that, if Mrs. Simons had failed to appear
in Florida after her husband's death, she would have been cut off
from Florida assets by the discharge of his executors. 77 But this would
have been equally true of clearly "personal" alimony or contract claims,
which could not have been cut off in. an ordinary proceeding. The
extraordinary powers of probate and insolvency courts derive from
the necessity in such proceedings to make a final disposition of the
property as against possibly numerous, scattered, and unascertainable
claimants.78 Mr. Simons' divorce suit, however, presented no such
75 Either literally or by moving his domicile, under the ponderous slogan "mobila
sequuntur personam."
76 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
77 See Goonamc, CONFLicT OF LAws 349 (4th ed. Scoles 1964); D. Currie, supra note 64,
at 451.
78 Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co,, 339 U.S. S06 (1950) (settlement of
trustee's account). See Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessitv-.An Analysis of the Mullane, Case,
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necessity. Especially since no particular assets were encumbered by
Mrs. Simons' claim, there was no more need to extinguish it without
the contacts ordinarily required than there was to extinguish Mrs.
Estin's claim for alimony-and the latter the Supreme Court held
Nevada could not do.
D. Conclusion
It must be apparent that I find the problem in Simons a most intricate and refractory one and the Supreme Court's disposition of it
something less than exhaustive. I am inclined to think the decision was
wrong, both in principle and on authority. I do not think Vanderbilt
can be adequately distinguished because the claim was for "dower,"
because the property was in the divorcing state, or because the claim
was contrary to state law. But if Simons is instead a proper corollary
to Williams 1, then Williams I ought to be overruled.
Of more practical importance is the question of the probable impact
of Simons on future cases. Despite Mr. Justice Harlan's exuberant observation that the Court was retreating from Vanderbilt, neither he nor any
other member of the Court took issue with the essential principle announced there that the state of the wife's domicile is free to award
alimony after an ex parte foreign divorce purporting to cut off her
rights. It is possible to read the majority opinion in Simons as holding
that this principle does not apply to rights that are inchoate at the
time of the divorce, but I would not so read it. The main focus of
the majority opinion, as well as of that of Justices Black and Douglas,
seems to be upon the fact that Florida law did not recognize a right
to dower following an ex parte divorce. The Court certainly did not
say that New York would have been powerless to grant the widow a
statutory share had it chosen to do so, and the argument denying New
York that power-that inchoate rights are not "property"-has an outof-place ring in today's Supreme Court.79 In contrast, the argument that
a state is free to recognize or to ignore an ex parte divorce, insofar as
property matters are affected, is an attractive one. Further, it has
considerable support from the courts and the writers, and it is assisted
by the emphasis placed in Estin upon the interest of the wife's state
of domicile in providing for her support. My prediction is that the
100 U. PA. L. REv. 305, 311 (1951). Nor was jurisdiction over Mrs. Simons necessary, as
often in interpleader cases, in order to protect her husband from having to pay the same
debt twice. See Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957). If, as
respondent argued, Brief, p. 53, successive marriages should subject Mr. Simons' estate to
more than one dower claim, that would but be the consequence of assuming obligations to
several wives, as commonly occurs with alimony.
79 Cf. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
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Court will continue to permit the states to assert this interest, by
granting alimony, widows' allotments, dower, or what-have-you, but
that it will not require the states to make such awards against their
will.80
II. DrVORCE BY CONSENT-Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel
"If everybody minded their own business," the Duchess said, in a hoarse growl,
"'the world would go round a deal faster than it does."
"Which would not be an advantage," said Alice.
Lewis Carroll

Nobody, it seems, ever denied that Mr. and Mrs. Kaufman were New
Yorkers by citizenship, domicile, and residence; and New York at all
relevant times permitted divorce only for adultery.8 ' Nothing daunted,
Mr. Kaufman paid an hour's visit to Juarez, Mexico; his wife's attorney
appeared to admit everything; and they emerged with a divorce based
on "incompatibility and ill treatment." Still in New York, Mrs.
Kaufman became Mrs. Rosenstiel; but a few years later Mr. Rosenstiel
obtained an annulment from a New York trial court on the ground
that his wife's Mexican divorce was invalid. The Appellate Division
82
reversed, and its decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Recognition of a bilateral Mexican divorce, said the state's highest
court, "offends no public policy of this State." Two judges disagreed.
The problem in Rosenstiel was not the knotty one of protecting an
absent spouse against an unfair assertion of jurisdiction, but rather
the analytically simpler one of collusion and false conflicts in the
S0 Even if the Court should hold that the principles underlying Simons preclude a state
from recognizing dower or other inchoate rights following an ex parte divorce, a state
would presumably remain free to protect the wife's continuing need for support by
ordering alimony with the express provision that payments shall continue after the
husband's death.
The possible in rem justification for the Court's decision was neither argued nor adverted
to in the opinion, and its possible persuasiveness to the Court is difficult to assess. See, however, Mr. Justice Harlan's statement that "If Mr. Vanderbilt owned property in New York at
the time of the ex parte divorce, New York might arguably be free to hold that ownership
of New York property carries with it the obligation to support one's wife, at least to the
extent of the value of that property." 381 U.S. at 87 n.2. The issue is important, because
the wife's state, following either the policy of looking out for its widows or the traditional
rule that interests in a decedent's personal property are governed by the law of his last
domicile, RESTATEMFNT, CONFLICr OF LAws § 303 (1934), might attempt to award her
an interest in property in the divorcing state.
81 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 313, § 7, since amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254,
§ 2, to include additional grounds. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170.
82 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 43 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 21 App:
Div. 2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d
86 (1965).
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choice of law. Here modem history begins with the Supreme Court's
second Williams decision.8 3
A. The Constitution and Choice of Divorce Law: Williams II
Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix had spent the requisite six weeks
in a Nevada motel, married each other, and hastened back into the
waiting arms of the North Carolina prosecutor. In its first decision,
dealing with the ex parte aspect of the divorces, the Supreme Court
had assumed the parties had actually moved to Nevada. 84 But North
Carolina held the Nevada domicile a sham and again convicted them
of bigamy; the Supreme Court affirmed. Domicile of at least one party,
wrote Mr. Justice Frankfurter, was a requisite of divorce jurisdiction;
the full faith and credit clause did not preclude the state of North
Carolina, which had not been a party to the ex parte proceeding, from
collaterally attacking Nevada's jurisdiction; and there was plenty of
evidence to support the finding that Mr. Williams and his second wife
had never intended to stay in Nevada.
Williams II, unlike Williams I, was basically a good decision. The
divorces had been granted on grounds not recognized in North
Carolina,85 and they were just as offensive to North Carolina's policy
as if they had been granted at home. For North Carolina would have
refused to divorce Mr. Williams and his intended wife, not in order
to give local judges more golf time or to keep their hands pure, but
in order to preserve marriages.88 To require North Carolina to recognize the divorces, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, would have been to make
the state "powerless to protect either its own policy or the family rights
of its people."8 7 Nevada, on the other hand, was simply meddling. Its
only interest in divorcing North Carolinians was the parasitic one
88
(candidly admitted in the analogous case of the Virgin Islands ) of
325 U.S. 226 (1945).
317 U.S. 287 (1942); see part I supra.
85 See State v. Williams, 224 N.C. 183, 187, 29 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1944).
8 Grounds for divorce are limited, the North Carolina court has said, because with
specific exceptions "the lawmaking power has adhered to the obligation of the marriage
vow, that the parties 'take each other for better or for worse, to live together in sickness
and in health till death do them part.'" Lee v. Lee, 182 N.C. 61, 63-64, 108 S.E. 352, 353
(1921). Similarly, a statute excluding admissions of adultery in divorce suits was said to be
"designed to ... prevent collusion" and to be based in part upon "that interest which
society has at stake in the preservation of the marriage relations of its members." Hooper
v. Hooper, 165 N.C. 605, 609, 81 S.E. 933, 935 (1914); Perkins v. Perkins, 88 N.C. 41, 43
83
81

(1883).
87 Williams v. North Carolina (1), 317 U.S. 287, 312 (1942) (dissenting). See also D. Currie,
Flags of Convenience, American Labor, and the Conflict of Laws, 1963 SuP. CT. Rav. 34,

83-87.
88 "It is estimated that over $300,000 a year is spent within the Virgin Islands by
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making money by subverting another state's laws-an interest that
cannot be recognized without destroying the principle that each state
is entitled to manage its own affairs. In divorcing Mr. Williams and
Mrs. Hendrix, Nevada frustrated the interest of North Carolina without advancing any legitimate interest of its own. It therefore deprived
law
the absent spouses of liberty or property without due process of
89
Carolina.
North
of
laws
the
to
credit
and denied full faith and
B. Validity and Recognition
But there were three things seriously wrong with Williams II. The
first was the Court's meticulous failure, in the face of separate opinions
raising the issue, 0 to hold that the divorces were void in Nevada as
well as in North Carolina. Mr. Justice Frankfurter did say that domicile
was a question of "jurisdiction" and that North Carolina might inquire
into Nevada's "power to pass on the merits." 91 But he also said that,
because North Carolina's judgment was supported by adequate evipersons who have been using the facilities of our divorce law to put their homes in order.
Unfortunately, because of an error in the draft of the original law. . . it now becomes
necessary for us to consider another amendment which is designed to enhance this
u-coming [sic] business." Proceedings and Debates, 17th Legislative Assembly of the
Virgin Islands, 3d Sess. 46-47 (1953) (remarks of Mr. Rohlsen), reported in GranvilleSmith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955).
89 See Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 976
n.388 (1960). Judge Hastie has suggested that due process, Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667,
685 (3d Cir. 1953), and Mr. Justice Jackson that full faith, Full Faith and Credit-The
Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 14 (1945), may forbid applying
the divorce law of a disinterested jurisdiction. Recent Supreme Court decisions have
refused to require one interested state to defer to another, e.g., Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co.,
380 U.S. 39 (1965); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); but they have not impaired the principle that
full faith, Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Broderick
v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935), and due process, Hartford Acc. S. Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine
Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), at times require
application of foreign law. If this is ever true, it must be in cases in which the forum
has no interest in applying its own law, see B. CUuE, SELEC ED EssAys ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWs 289 & ch. 5 (1963); and the Court in upholding choices of law against constitutional challenge continues to emphasize the interest served by the chosen law. The
invocation of due process to strike down unreasonable choices of law is analogous to its
use to limit the unreasonable extension into other states of a state's power to tax, Thomas
v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 443 (1960), reaffirmingBlodgett v. Silverman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928); Miller
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1953), or to hear cases, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958). If marriage is viewed as comprising nonwaivable rights, even the consenting
defendant is deprived of liberty or property without due process by a divorce contrary
to the law of the only interested state.
90 Mr. Justice Murphy, concurring, defended the decision because it left Nevada with
power to divorce anyone for any cause, so far as validity in Nevada was concerned. 325
U.S. at 239. Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting, was critical of the decision for the same
reason. id. at 244, 257.
91 325 U.S. at 229.
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dence, it could not be upset "even if we also found in the record of
the court of original judgment warrant for its finding that it had
jurisdiction, ' 92 and the Supreme Court of Nevada has stressed this
unfortunate aspect of Williams II in holding a Nevada divorce that
had been refused recognition elsewhere nevertheless valid in Nevada.93
Thus, the Court in Williams I1ignored the only really good point it
had made in Williams I: that the validity of a divorce must be the same
in every state. 94 If Mr. Williams and his charming friend really moved
to Nevada, applying Nevada law served Nevada's interest in freeing
her people from the restraints of a dead marriage, and the command
of the Constitution, supported by sound policy, is that the divorce
must be respected in other states. If, on the other hand, as seems
obvious from the reported facts, they went to Nevada only to get
divorced and to return, the application of Nevada law was as unconstitutional for Nevada's purposes as for North Carolina's. 95 This
difficulty, however, appears to have been set right by the Court's later
holding in Sherrer v. Sherrer, for if, as Williams II suggests, a divorce
valid where granted may nevertheless be denied recognition elsewhere,
a decision upholding the divorce court's jurisdiction should not have
been held, as it was in Sherrer, to preclude attack on the question of
recognition.9
97 Alton v. Alton
C. Domicile and Jurisdiction:
The second unfortunate aspect of Williams II was its statement that
domicile is indispensable to jurisdiction to divorce.98 The Third Circuit
has taken this quite seriously. A Virgin Islands statute conferred divorce
92 Id. at 234. For Mr. Justice Frankfurter, at least, the omission was deliberate; he later
said explicitly: "[A] divorce may satisfy due process requirements, and be valid where
rendered, and still lack the jurisdictional requisites for full faith and credit to be mandatory." Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 568 n.16 (1948) (dissenting opinion); see 15 STAN. L.

REv. 331, 338-39 (1963).
93 Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 158, 369 P.2d 1019, 1023 (1962); see note 136 infra.
94 317 U.S. 287, 293-95, 299-302 (1942); accord, 63 COLum. L. Rxv. 560, 568 (1963).
Contra, 39 CORNE.LL L.Q. 293, 300-01 (1954).
05 The finding of ultimate constitutional facts is no novelty for the Court. See, e.g.,
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.) (involuntariness of confession).
96 334 U.S. 343 (1938); see 40 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 992, 995-96 (1965). This last point was
made by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 334 U.S. at 367 n.16 (dissenting opinion).
97 See generally Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAzv. L. REv.
909, 966-71, 975-76 (1960).
98 325 U.S. at 229; accord, RSTATEMENT (SECoND), CONFLtrT OF LAws § Ill (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1953); STUMBE G, CONFLICT OF LAws 293 (3d ed. 1963). But see EHRENZWEIG,
CONFLICT OF LAws 238-42 (1962). See also GOODRICH, CONFLCr OF LAws 256, 258 (4th ed.
Scoles 1964), predicting that divorce based on residence would be upheld by the Supreme
Court.
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jurisdiction after six weeks' presence by the plaintiff, the defendant
appearing or being personally served. In Alton v. Alton the court
struck it down under the due process clause.99
My objection is not that the court of appeals extended the principle
of Williams II to encompass validity as well as recognition, for I agree
the two should be congruent. But, as Judge Hastie demonstrated in
his outstanding dissent, 100 the problem is not jurisdiction so much as
choice of law. The danger, the majority agreed, 10 1 was that the Virgin
Islands might divorce nonresidents for simple incompatibility, contrary
to the policy of their home states. What the majority overlooked was
that the paramount interest of the domicile is protected by the constitutional requirement that its law be applied in any forum. 10 2 To
forbid the Virgin Islands to divorce nonresidents in accordance with
the law of their home states may be not only unnecessary, but also
harsh, for there may be many people-servicemen, students, government employees, for example-who are not trying to evade the application of the proper law, but for whom it would be most inconvenient
to return home to obtain a divorce. 10 3 Outside the swamp of divorce,
it is common for a disinterested forum to entertain an action based
on foreign law. Alton is a strange bedfellow for the Supreme Court's
twin decisions that, because of the constitutional policy of "maximum
enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states," neither the forum nor the state
that created the cause of action may forbid suit in a convenient forum. 0 4
Nevertheless, the command of Hughes v. Fetter that states with no
interest in the merits must entertain actions based on foreign law is
not an absolute one. First, it seems reasonably clear that a state may
decline to provide a forum in order to further a legitimate policy promoting the orderly and efficient administration of its courts. 05 Ad09 207 F.2d 667 (1953).
100 Id. at 684-85.
101 Id. at 666-67.
-102 See 39 CoRNmL L.Q. 293, 298 (1954).
103 See Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923). New Yorkers who had lived
in France for five years were divorced in France under New York law. New York recognized the divorce. Several states have statutes to deal with the soldier problem, *see
C nasa_.Am, GRISWOLD, REESE & ROSENBERG, CASES ON CONFUCT OF lAws, 855-56 (5th ed.
1964); Leflar, Conflict of Laws and Family Law, 14 AR. L. REv. 47 (1960), but they have
been treated as permitting application of forum law as well. Residence may indeed be a
sufficient basis to sustain a policy of relief from the restraint of marriage; but there may
also be cases short of such substantial connection where the parties' convenience justifies
providing a forum for applying another state's law.
104 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George,
233 U.S. 354 (1914); see B. CuuauE, op. cit. supra note 89, at ch. 6.
105 See B. Cunmax, op. cit. supra note 89, at 360 & ch. 6. A state may avoid the unreason-
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mittedly, this was not the case in Alton, for Barkis himself could not
have been more willing than the Virgin Islands to try foreign divorce
cases, though the intention plainly was that local law would be applied.
But if a state were to refuse to hear convenient and timely divorce cases
based on foreign law, the question would arise whether the national
policy of enforcing foreign rights is overcome by a state policy such
as the prevention of perjury in the courts, 10 6 or perhaps by an antipathy
to the particular grounds of the foreign law. 107
More important for our purposes are those cases in which courts
have declined or have been forbidden to entertain foreign cases because
of the nature of the subject matter. 08 Under present law the risk of
able burden of litigating stale foreign claims by applying its own short statute of limitation, Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1952); see B. CuRRIE, op. cit. supra
note 89, at 266, and of litigating inconvenient ones by invoking forum non conveniens,
see Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (state courts may
invoke doctrine to dismiss FELA claim supremacy clause ordinarily requires them to
take); Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (doctrine approved for federal
courts); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (dictum); B. CuRwiu, op. cit. supra
note 89, at 325; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117e (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1957). Though the forum in Wells was also the defendant's principal place of business, the
Court did not rely on this fact; the decision should and probably would have been the
same had the forum been wholly without contacts save as forum.
106 See B. CuoPum, op. cit. supra note 89, at 356-58, suggesting that New York might
constitutionally refuse to entertain foreign actions of the types outlawed by its heartbalm statute in order to prevent its courts from being used as "instruments of extortion
and blackmail." See also B. Cuouut, Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds: An Inquiry
into the "Rule of Validation," 18 OKLA. L .REv, 243, 248-49 (1965), doubting that such a
policy is expressed by the Statute of Frauds. In any state that grants divorces only for
fault, however, the policy of preventing fraud is too imperfectly observed at home to
avoid the conclusion that the state is discriminating against foreign causes of action.
107 "Public policy" is usually invoked by a state interested in the merits to justify its
departure from mechanical choice-of-law rules. See Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in
the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 969 (1956). Beyond this, it is often stated that
no court need enforce a foreign right that is contrary to "some fundamental principle of
justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal." Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918);
see R.STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 612 (1934). Even a disinterested court might
legitimately decline to demean itself by enforcing a contract to murder or a Nazi racial
decree, see Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798
(1938), but any exception to full faith and credit carved on this basis must be narrow
indeed if it is not to swallow the rule. A state does not injure its divorce policy by
applying more lenient foreign law to divorce nonresidents, for they are not within that
policy; nor do I think disagreement over divorce policy rises to the level at which the
court by applying foreign law so compromises itself as to injure its own standing.
108 Some exceptions to the principle of transitory actions are disappearing for want of
justification: (1) The local action rule respecting trespass to land. Livingston v. Jefferson,
15 Fed. Cas. 660 (No. 8511), (C.C.D. Va. 1811); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws
§ 117i (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957); see id. comment a, describing the rule as a pointless
yestige of the days when all actions were local because jurors were expected to have
personal knowledge of the facts; Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73
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error in applying foreign law cannot alone prevent the ordinary action
from being treated as transitory, because the Supreme Court held in
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. George0 9 that a state may not
confine personal injury actions to its own courts. But the case for
keeping litigation at home*is strengthened when, as under the federal
labor laws" 0 and most workmen's compensation laws,"' the general
courts of the enacting sovereign are also excluded in order to promote
uniform and expert enforcement; when, as in criminal sentencing, the
effectuation of vital policy is entrusted in large part to the discretion
of knowledgeable and sympathetic judges; 1 2 when, as in maritime in
rem and limitation suits and bankruptcy, the controversy is made both
H v. L. REv. 909, 980-83 (1960). (2) Tax laws. See the excellent discussion in State ex rel.
Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946), enforcing
a foreign tax claim; B. CumRI, op. cit. supra note 89, at 342-44; cf. Milwaukee County v.
M.E. White., 296 U.S. 268 (1935), requiring enforcement of a sister state tax judgment.
(3) Laws "penal" only in that they provide damages not proportioned to harm. See Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953), refusing to enforce a foreign law
holding incorporators liable as partners when articles were not properly filed. A dissent
argued (quite rightly except as to defendants within the state's policy of encouraging
investment or as to those for whom the forum was inconvenient) that this refusal
violated the full faith and credit clause. See B. CuRIE, op. cit. supra note 89, at 337-42;
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 18-20 (4th ed. Scoles 1964). Despite the Court's disclaimer of
an intention to affect interstate cases, the decision in Testa v, Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947),
that a state may not refuse to enforce federal penal (noncriminal) laws, seems of considerable significance here. For, absent a policy relating to court administration, a. state with
no interest in the merits must defer to other state laws under the full faith clause just as
it must defer to federal under the supremacy clause.
109 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
110 But see Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARv.
L. REv. 641, 652-55 (1961), arguing that labor pre-emption has been carried too far in
damage cases.
111 See Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 348 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1965) (Alabama will not
enforce -Georgia statute); 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 84.20 (1952). On an
earlier appeal in Crider, 380 U.S. 39 (1965), the Supreme Court, answering a question not
properly in the case, deftly disposed of the annoying problem of Pearson v. Northeast
Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), by upholding Alabama's power to compensate her
injured residents by applying Georgia law without its limitations. The more interesting
question, presented but not decided, was whether Hughes and George together required
Alabama to enforce Georgia law contrary to the wishes of both states, and despite
Georgia's policy of centralizing compensation cases in an expert tribunal.
112 But enforcement of foreign criminal laws is not unknown. The federal courts in
civil rights and federal officer cases exercise jurisdiction over state law crimes, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1442, 1443 (1964); see Georgia v. Rachel, 382 U.S. 808 (1966); Tennessee v. Davis,
100 U.S. 257 (1880), and it has been urged that much federal criminal litigation should
be left to the states. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 293
(1928); HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 398-99 (1953).
Interstate enforcement, however, is complicated by the common provision for jury trial
where the offense was committed. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Rodgers, 238
Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946).
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difficult and important by the presence of multiple parties; 113 when,
as in state habeas for federal prisoners, there is thought to be substantial hostility in other jurisdictions toward important policies of the
enacting sovereign; 114 or when, as the ALI has suggested is the case
with patents, copyright, and antitrust, the sovereign has an interest
that is "more important than the wishes of the parties." 1 5 In general
it may be said that the case for exclusive jurisdiction is at its height
when error is unusually likely or unusually serious. 16
Several of the factors suggested above apply to divorce cases. First,
statutes confining divorce jurisdiction to specialized courts in the home
state itself 117 increase the degree of expertise lost by allowing foreign
suits. There may be discrepancies between theory and practice in the
administration of the divorce law, and custom may be as important as
reported decisions in determining what constitutes "extreme cruelty."
The judge may also be accorded considerable leeway to be exercised
in the light of his familiarity with local practice; in the Altons' home
state of Connecticut, for example, he is said to have "discretion"
whether or not to grant a divorce if cause is shown. 118 Moreover, divorce
is unusual in that the state's policy of preserving marriages is likely
113 See D. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup.
CT. REV. 158, 169-70.
114 Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871) (military recruitment); Ableman v.
Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859) (fugitive slaves). But see Arnold, The Power of State
Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385 (1964), suggesting that an absolute
prohibition was not required to protect federal interests.
115 ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETwEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 60

(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966). Because the parties are often truly adversary, because those
not parties are not bound by the decision, because the field is not a hotbed of federalstate antagonism, and because of decisions permitting states to determine even the validity
of patents when raised defensively, see Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255
(1877); HART& WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 754-58 (1953), I
dloubt the strength of this consideration in patent and copyright cases.
116 Cf. the various provisions made for avoiding error in the extremely sensitive field
of federal injunctions against state officials, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (1964) (tax and
utility-rate injunctions); 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964) (see D. Currie, The Three-Judge Court in
Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1964)); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) (anti-suit
injunctions, see Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State and Federal Courts, 32
U. Chi. L. Rev. 471 (1965)); Railroad Comm. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention).
The doctrine that one state will not interfere with the internal affairs of another's
corporations "enjoys less force" than in the past, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws
§ 117e (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957), and the ALI relegates it to a mere facet of forum non
conveniens, id. comment d. The doctrine can be abused to defeat ordinary transitory
actions, but a foreign court's "detailed and continued supervision" might subtly infringe
the incorporating state's policy as well as burden the forum. Ibid,
117 E.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-3 (Supp. 1965). See State v. Zittel, 94 R.I. 325, 180 A.2d
455, 457 (1962) (dictum).
118 Kelsall v. Kelsall, 139 Conn. 163, 168, 90 A.2d 878, 881 (1952).
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not to be adequately safeguarded by either of the parties: the foreign
divorce in which both husband and wife seek to-circumvent that policy
is the prototype, not the exception. This makes it the more important,
if that policy is to be served and error avoided, that the suit be tried
before a judge fully cognizant of that policy and, even if not sympathetic, responsive to institutional pressures to enforce it. Connecticut,
in this vein, has made it the court's duty to protect the state's interest
if the litigants do not,119 and several states go further and require or
permit the state's attorney to intervene for this purpose. 20 Such protection as this would be hard to duplicate in another jurisdiction,
especially in one steeped in a sharply contrasting tradition.
A further difficulty is presented by the increasing number of statutes
providing for conciliation services designed to head off unnecessary
divorces. 1 1 To ask the Virgin Islands to provide such services for
Connecticut people against its wishes would be excessive; 12 2 to permit
the Islands to divorce them without benefit of conciliation would
thwart Connecticut policy. Moreover, even if the Islands chose to make
this service available to nonresident divorce litigants, the plainly freewheeling, discretionary nature of conciliation makes it quite unlikely
that the service rendered would be more than a rough approximation
of what would have been done at home.
Accordingly, even within the confines of the George case, a good
argument could be made for permitting-indeed requiring-the Virgin
Islands to defer to an expression by Connecticut of its opposition to
foreign suits based on Connecticut divorce laws. Arguably, too, George
itself should be overruled: even in the ordinary personal injury action
a disinterested state has no legitimate interest in flooding its courts
with inconvenient -cases, while the state that created the right may
have a respectable policy, corresponding to that underlying forum non
conveniens, in favor of keeping its cases in convenient courts. 123 The
119 See Casale v. Casale, 138 Conn. 490, 86 A.2d 568 (1952).
120 E.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 107.040 (1963): "The district attorney, so far as may be
necessary to prevent fraud or collusion in the suit, shall control the proceedings on the
part of the defense and in case the defendant does not appear therein or defend against
the same in good faith, shall make a defense therein on behalf of the state." See Smythe
v. Smythe, 80 Ore. 150, 149 Pac. 516 (1915).
. 121 E.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 215. See GoLzsruN & KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE
LAW
140-62 (1965).

1 122 See

REsrATEMENT (SPCOND), CONVLICr or LAWs

§ 117f (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953); cf.

Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 362-64 (1952) (FELA jury if state had
abolished juries---dictum).
123 The anomaly of the George decision is heightened by contrast to the established
principle that a court may localize an action by enjoining the plaintiff from suing in
another jurisdiction. See Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, Injunctions Against Suit and
Full Faith and Credit; 29-U. Cm. L. REv. 740 (1962). The contrast is ameliorated £ime.
what by the common, and probably erroneous, holding that such injunctions are not
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principal purpose of the full faith and credit clause, insofar as foreign
laws are concerned, is to require disinterested states to defer to interested ones. It is not clear that the clause embodies in addition a policy
favoring transitory actions in opposition to the wishes of the only
24
interested state.'
But that is not to say, as the court of appeals said, that domicile is
a "jurisdictional" requirement. If the Islands are to be forbidden to
enforce Connecticut divorce laws, this is out of deference to Connecticut localizing policy. If there is no such policy, the Islands may (and
must under Hughes v. Fetter, unless their refusal is supported by a
policy of efficient court administration) entertain the suit and apply
the law of the domicile. Whether such a procedure would have offended
Connecticut's substantive or the Island's procedural policy the court
made no effort to ascertain.
D. Collateral Attack: Sherrer and Other Btes Noires
The third difficulty with Williams 11 could not be attributed to the
opinion itself, much less to its author. The difficulty was that Williams'
salutary and refreshing principle was rendered virtually impotent by
later decisions from which Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented with vigor.
The villain of the piece was Sherrerv. Sherrer,which with its entourage made clear that the divorcing state might preclude a spouse who
had appeared or who was subject to personal jurisdiction from later
challenging the decree in any state, even for lack of domicile. 125 This
decision was in complete accord with contemporary notions of full
entitled to full faith and credit. E.g., James v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 14 Ill. 2d 356,
152 N.E.2d 858 (1958). And the contrast may be justified in part by the greater specificity
of the injunction, assuring that only appropriate cases are localized.
124 See B. CuaREE, op cit. supra note 89, at 322-25. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT
OF LAws § 1171 & comment a (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957), accepts George because "otherwise
the plaintiff would be remediless if the defendant were to remove both himself and his
property from the state where the cause of action arose." This danger is vanishing before
the rush of long arm statutes, see D. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years
of Extended Personal Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; in any event it seems
to be the business of the state that created the cause of action.
125 Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 127 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587
(1951); Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949) (dictum); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer
v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). In Rice collateral attack was allowed because there had been
neither personal jurisdiction nor appearance; in Cook the case was remanded to ascertain whether there had been either. Domicile was denied by the answer in Sherrer, and
admitted in Coe; in Johnson the merits were contested and domicile ignored. Dicta in
Rice, Johnson, and Cook are explicit that personal service is enough without an appearance. Mr. Justice Frankfurter thought Sherrer a departure from precedent, viewing
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1940), as based on the Supreme Court's finding domicile in
the divorcing state. Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra at 358 n.l (dissenting opinion). In this he
seems to have been mistaken, for the Court in Davis expressly said the issue had been
litigated and was thus foreclosed. 305 U.S. at 40.
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faith and res judicata outside the divorce field, for the Supreme Court
had sensibly held that, for jurisdictional issues as well as others, one
opportunity to litigate is quite enough. 126 But Sherrer ignored the
peculiar nature of divorce proceedings: by cutting off the possibility
of attack by the party most likely to challenge the divorce later on,
the Court destroyed an important means of protecting the home state's
interest in preserving its marriages.
The doctrine of quasi estoppel, often invoked by state courts to
prevent collateral attack by one who procured, connived at, or took
128
advantage of a foreign divorce, 127 is unfortunate for the same reason,
despite its appeal to basic notions that one ought not be allowed to
blow hot and cold or to benefit from one's own deceits. The Supreme
Court has only made matterg worse by extending Sherrer to prohibit
even those who were not parties, but who are barred by the law of
the divorcing state, from attacking a bilateral divorce.129 Nor is this
rule confined to persons who might be held in privity with the spouses;
in Johnson v. Muelberger the Court held that even "strangers" might
be precluded from collateral attack, and eminent writers have concluded even the home state itself cannot challenge a foreign divorce
unless it was rendered ex parte.130
126 E.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) (full faith), where subject-matter jurisdiction had been litigated; Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.
371, 878 (1940) (res judicata between federal courts), where it had not. The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), CONFLIcr oF LAws § 403d, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964), states that
whether the issue has been litigated is relevant in determining whether it will be foredosed, and certainly the policy against litigating an issue twice is inoperative if jurisdiction has been defaulted. But res judicata also embodies a policy against piecemeal
litigation that is applicable whenever, as in Johnson v. Muelberger and Chicot County,
the merits have been litigated; and a policy in favor of expediting final settlement of
disputes that applies even to -a judgment defaulted as to both merits and jurisdiction. As
with matters going to the merits, jurisdictional issues ought generally to be foreclosed if
there has been an adequate opportunity to litigate them. See Developments in the Law
-State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L. Rav. 909, 997-98 (1960).
127 E.g., Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940).
128 See Comment, Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees, 32 U. CH. L. REv. 802, 814
(1965). Estoppel may be justified if the interests of innocent third parties would be
affected. Ibid.
129 Cook v. Cook, 842 U.S. 126 (1951) (subsequent spouse); Johnson v. Muelbergei, 840
U.S. 581 (1951) (daughter by prior marriage).
130 See EMENzWEIG, CONFLICr OF LAws 253 (1962); GooDRcI, CONFLICr OF LAWS 259 &
n.30 (4th ed. Scoles 1964). Contra, von Mehren, The Validity of Foreign Divorces, 45 MAss.
L.Q. 28, 29 (1960); Cavers, Book Review, 47 CALIF. L. Rav. 414, 417 (1959). See Sutton v.
Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 408 (1952) (dictum): "If the Nevada court had had jurisdiction by
its decree of divorce would have been
personal service in the state or appearance ....
unassailable in other states."
I am not persuaded that attack by the state is foreclosed. First, while reserving the
question of a state's power to disregard a finding made after active contest, the Court in
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Further, even if Johnson has not foreclosed attack by the state, prosecuting Nevada divorcees for bigamy is a little like going after butterflies with an elephant gun. It takes a small town scandal, such as that in
Williams, to provoke prosecution, and the threat is too remote to deter.
The upshot of Sherrer and Johnson thus seems to be, as others have
said,13 ' that by appearing in a foreign court a husband and wife can
obtain a virtually unchallengeable divorce on grounds not recognized
132
by their home state.
Williams II stressed that: "those not parties to a litigation ought not to be foreclosed by
the interested actions of others; especially not a State which is concerned with the
vindication of its own social policy and has no means, certainly no effective means, to
protect that interest against the selfish action of those outside its borders." Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945). Moreover, in Johnson the Court suggested that
a daughter might be barred because she had only an "expectancy" in her father's estate
at the time of the divorce and therefore lacked standing ever to contest the decree, 340
U.S. at 688; this cannot be true of the state, which traditionally has standing to attack a
divorce in order to vindicate its interest in preventing bigamy. Further, Professor Ehrenzweig has observed that barring those neither party nor privy cannot be justified by
traditional in rem theory, for "the very essence of in rein jurisdiction . . . is the actual
situs of the res within the court's jurisdiction, and this is lacking in the absence of bona
fide domicile." EHRENZWEIG, CONFLIC or LAws 252 (1962). See, e.g., Riley v. New York
Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942); Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 894 (1917), permitting
persons not personally served to challenge collaterally the basis of jurisdiction in rem.
A Florida court, in Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 157 So. 2d 199, 200 (Fla.
App. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 381 U.S. 81 (1965), discussed in Part I of this paper, has
even extended res judicata to ex parte divorces, barring a spouse who was not subject to
personal jurisdiction and who did not appear from collaterally attacking a finding of
domicile because she could have raised the issue by defending the original suit. This is
contrary to the usual doctrine in cases not involving divorce, see York v. Texas, 137 U.S.
15, 20 (1890) (which unfortunately permitted a state to forbid special appearances on the
mistaken assumption that collateral attack was an adequate substitute); Developments in
the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HxAv. L. REv. 909, 991 (1960), and highly questionable in policy, for even Williams I in divorce cases does not make it fair to summon an
absent defendant to an inconvenient forum unless the plaintiff lives there, and to require a defendant to appear in an inconvenient forum in order to object to it to some
extent undermines the jurisdictional limitation-though the burden is obviously less
than that of defending the merits. See ibid. Arguably, the Florida rule violates the due
process clause because it affords inadequate opportunity to object to an unconstitutional
assertion of jurisdiction. If not, Florida's decision in Simons, combined with Mr. Ehrenzweig's expansive view of Johnson v. Muelberger, gives the divorce milis power to wipe
Williams I1 off the books altogether.
131 E.g., EHRENzwEiG, CONFLICT OF LAWs 237, 243 (1962); GooDRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAwS
259 (4th ed. Scoles 1964); Merrill, The Utility of Divorce Recognition Statutes in Dealing
with the Problem of Migratory Divorce, 27 TaxAs L. Ray. 290, 308-09 (1949); Comment,
supra note 128, 32 U. Cm. L R.v. at 811.
132 It may still be possible to base collateral attack upon a Nevada divorce on the
traditionally acceptable ground of fraud. See the commendable opinion in Staedler v.
Staedler, 6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951), holding Sherrer inapplicable to fraud cases and
refusing to estop a participant in the fraud; von Mehren, The Validity of Foreign
Divorces, 45 MAss. L.Q. 28, 28 (1960); 1949 Wis. L. Rav. 173, 180. But success on this ground
appears unlikely. Later cases have modified this doctrine even in New Jersey. See
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Even if domicile is deemed a matter of choice 6f law rather than
of jurisdiction, precedents denying collateral attack are distinguishable.
The first Mr. Justice White, dissenting in Fauntleroy v. Lum, complained that to forbid collateral attack upon an erroneous application
of foreign law would "endow each State with authority to overthrow
the public policy and criminal statutes of the others, thereby depriving
all of their. lawful authority."' 33 He was wrong in that case, for the
adversary nature of a contract dispute and the availability of direct
review in the Supreme Court give substantial assurance that the policies
of the interested state will be respected. In such a case, if a defendant
,chooses not to appeal, it is easy to argue that it is more important
to end litigation than to give him a second chance. But this justification vanishes in the ordinary foreign divorce case, since both plaintiff
and defendant will be doing their level best to frustrate the home
state's interest. 134 The rule should fall with its justification. To forbid
collateral attack on a Nevada divorce is to use the full faith and credit
clause to destroy its own principle that each state is entitled to manage
its own affairs.
The virtue of this argument is also its price: the uncertainty permitted by collateral attack will discourage Nevada divorces, 3 5 but it
will also destroy the finality of all decrees in a field where uncertainty
is especially damaging. But if people want security in their marital
status, they should not obtain illegal divorces, and they should keep
careful proof of residence in obtaining legal ones. Sherrer ought to
be overruled; any interested party should be permitted collaterally to
attack a divorce, ex parte or bilateral, on the ground of an uncon36
stitutional choice of law.
-.

EuRFNzwEiG, CoNFrucr OF LAws 254-55 (1962). Further, the availability of collateral attack
usually depends upon the law of the state from which the judgment is taken, and
Nevada considers perjury as to domicile "intrinsic" fraud for which collateral attack is
disallowed. Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1962); see EHRENEWVEIG, op.
cit. supra, at 255; 63 COLUM. L. REv. 560, 561, 566 & n.43 (1963). Sherrer makes it seem
improbable that the Supreme Court would hold this limitation on attack unconstitutional.
133 210 U.S. 230, 239 (1908).
134 See voN MEsm N & TRAuTMAN, THE LAw OF MULTISTATE PROBrLms 1525 (1965).
135 See Comment, supra note 128, 32 U. CHr. L. REv. at 811 n.47.

136 Collateral attack on an unconstitutional choice of law in divorce could be justified
either on the theory that in rare cases a state may refuse to recognize even a valid
decree contrary to its interests, see Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 268, 273
(1943) (dictum); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1935)
(dictum); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting);
Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. Rnv.
153, 163 (1949), or, preferably, by holding that in the light of the inability of a spouse to
divest himself of marital rights by consent a state denies him due process if, without
domicile, it forbids collateral attack even in the state of divorce. The latter route would
have the advantage of preserving the identity of effect in various states that it seems the
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E. Foreign-CountryDivorces: Rosenstiel
It is bad enough that a state is forbidden to enforce its valid laws
by the full faith and credit clause as interpreted in Sherrer v. Sherrer.
But the decision of the Court of Appeals in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel
was doubly inexcusable, for the court chose to nullify New York
statutes without pretense of constitutional compulsion.
No legislator in his right mind would propose a statute embodying
purpose of the full faith and credit clause to provide. This theory would not necessarily
permit collateral attack on issues other than choice of law, for if a state has an interest
in terminating a marriage it may surely provide for any degree of consent or waiver by
the spouse it chooses.
The effect to be given in other states to a judgment refusing to recognize a foreign
divorce for lack of domicile was considered in Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952), and
Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 369 F.2d 1019 (1962). Both concerned Nevada divorces that
had been successfully challenged in collateral proceedings elsewhere. In Sutton the
Supreme Court held that a third state was required to respect an annulment of a
subsequent marriage based on the ineffectiveness of the divorce; in Colby Nevada refused
to set aside its divorce in deference to a separation decree with the same basis. The court
in Colby attempted to distinguish Sutton, arguing that the plaintiff in Sutton (a subsequent spouse) had not been a party to the divorce and that in Sutton "the Supreme
Court did not indicate that Mr. Henzel's divorce was not valid in Nevada." Id. at 157,
369 P.2d at 1023 (emphasis in original). But the first ground is irrelevant and the second
erroneous. The absent spouse in Colby was not bound by the Nevada decree either, since
he had not appeared or been subject to personal jurisdiction, and if Mrs. Sutton had been
a party the later New York decree annulling her marriage would still have been entitled
to recognition. Cf. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). As for the Nevada
court's second distinction, the Supreme Court in Sutton went out of its way to suggest
that the divorce was invalid in Nevada: "[A]s to the New York decree annulling the
marriage, New York had such jurisdiction of the parties and its decree is entitled to full
faith throughout the Nation, in Nevada as well as in Illinois. The New York invalidation
of the Nevada divorce stands in the same position. As Mrs. Henzel was neither personally
served in Nevada nor entered her appearance, the Nevada divorce decree was subject to
attack and nullification in New York for lack of jurisdiction over the parties in a
contested action." 342 U.S. at 408-09. Accord, 31 GEo. WAsH. L. RFv. 648, 650-51 (1963).
Any argument that Nevada owed no more faith to the Maryland decree than Maryland
owed to the Nevada misses the whole point of Sherrer, for the former had been contested and the latter had not. See 15 STAN. L. REv. 331, 335 (1963). But see Rocker v.
Celebrezze, 358 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1966); Wondsel v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 339 (2d
Cir. 1965), agreeing with Colby.
Both in Sutton and in Colby the proceedings challenging the Nevada divorces seemed
truly adverse. In Sutton, indeed, the wife, who had not gone to Nevada, filed for separate
maintenance only one month after'the divorce. The decree invalidating the divorce was
thus correctly recognized in Sutton and erroneously denied recognition in Colby. But it
should not be concluded that in every proceeding to set aside a divorce, as contrasted with
the divorce suit itself, there is no danger of collusion. For collusive proof that an earlier
divorce was invalid may be an attractive means of avoiding a subsequent marriage that
has gone sour.
The argument here advanced would not permit collateral attack on choice of law in
such areas as usury, gambling, infancy, or coverture; for despite the policy in such
matters to override the parties' joint intention, and the consequent frequency of attempts
to contract for application of foreign law, the filing of a coercive action after breach
assures adversary litigation.
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New York divorce law after Rosenstiel: "New Yorkers may not obtain
a divorce in this State except for adultery, 13 nor may they contract
to dissolve the marriage; 138 however, they may obtain a divorce in any
other jurisdiction on any ground they choose."'u 9 Those who believe
it wise to permit escape from unhappy marriages would not impose
the irrelevant condition of filing suit outside the state; those who
believe that changing partners is immoral and bad for the children
would not make it so ridiculously easy.
It has been argued that the availability of only one divorce ground
in New York is the result of historical accident rather than of conscious policy. The legislature, it is said, enacted the statute allowing
divorce for adultery in response to a petition seeking a legislative
divorce on that ground; other grounds were neither allowed nor forbidden, but simply not considered. 4 0 The same cannot be said of
the statute outlawing contracts to dissolve the marriage.' 41 But :it can
be respectably argued that New York's legislative policy is to allow
divorce for adultery; to forbid it by mere mutual consent; but to leave
to the courts whether or not to create additional grounds in between.
The"New York courts, however, have not so interpreted the statutes.
They have refused to grant divorces without adultery, and they have
declared very plainly that they read the legislation as expressing a
policy opposing divorce in other cases.' 42 Moreover, "incompatibility"
as administered in Juarez seems indistinguishable from divorce by
mere consent; 43 even if New York read its statutes to permit divorce
137 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 313, § 7, since amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254,

§ 2, to include additional grounds. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170.
138 N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAw § 5-311.

139 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
140 See 1966 N.Y. JoINT LEGISLATVE COMMITTEE ON MATIIMONIAL AND FAMILY LAws REP.
21 (testimony of Dr. Nelson M. Blake).
141 See N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONs LAW § 5-311.
142 See Weiman v. Weiman, 295 N.Y. 150, 154, 65 N.E.2d 754, 755-56 (1946), forbidding
waiver of a new trial following appeal in a divorce case as "opposed to a strong public
policy which favors the continuity of marriage"; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N.Y. 81, 85
126 N.E. 508, 509 (1920) (dictum), declaring New York's policy, before Williams I, of refusing to recognize foreign ex parte divorces of New Yorkers on grounds unknown to New
York: "The reason for the stated policy of this state is its statutory adoption of the rule
that there may be of right but one sufficient cause, to wit, adultery, for absolute divorce
...
. The policy of this state . . . exists to promote the permanency of the marriage
contracts and the morality of the citizens of the state."
The breakdown of this policy can be seen as early as 1938. See Glaser v. Glaser, 276
N.Y. 296, 12 N.E.2d 305 (1938). See also In the Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N.Y. 31, 36, 47
N.E.2d 681, 684 (1943). However, it was asserted vigorously in Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298
N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948).
143 See Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948), holding Mexican
divorces obtained without personal appearance contrary to the policy of the statute
prohibiting contracts to divorce. One writer protests that the policy of this statute extends

only to contracts and not to decrees based on mere consent, 29
(1965), but the two cannot be distinguished in principle.
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for any ground beyond the wishes of the parties, the divorce in
Rosenstiel could not pass muster.
If New York's public policy is to be found in the statutes, the
court's statement that recognition of the Mexican incompatibility
decree "offends no public policy of this state" cannot bear scrutiny.
But it is common knowledge that a great many New Yorkers found
the single-ground divorce law a bit archaic; perhaps the court did not
believe the statutes really represented public policy. This tack derives
considerable support from Professor Bickel's thesis that continued nonenforcement drains a statute of its force. 44 Nevertheless, it engenders
severe risks of error and of abuse.
To begin with, I am at a loss to see how the judges are to ascertain
that a statute no longer commands majority support. The infrequency
of bigamy prosecutions following foreign divorces does not prove that
most New Yorkers would allow divorce by consent, for many who
would refuse such divorces might shrink from the harshness of criminal
sanctions. Imperfect as the legislative process may be as a mirror of
public opinion, it is less so than the judicial process, which is largely
insulated from political pressures. Moreover, in our scheme of things
we rely on the legislature to express what the people want. It is true
that in New York's case the one-ground divorce law expressed the
feelings of nineteenth century New York and is not necessarily responsive to those of today. But it is not every hundred-year-old statute that
has lost its community support. To require reenactment of all laws
after twenty years, or after forty, would be either to impose a significant
burden on the legislatures or to encourage wholesale use of the rubber
stamp, the period chosen being in any case highly arbitrary; while
the slippery nature of sorting out those statutes which time and change
have rendered untrustworthy counsels against an ad hoc approach. I
think it would weaken the legislature's sense of responsibility, endanger
the principle of representative government, and violate New York's
doctrine of the separation of powers for the courts to disregard statutes
they feel do not reflect current majority opinion. If the New York
Court of Appeals disagrees, it ought to apply the principle frankly and
permit consent divorces in New York. But if, as I suspect, the court
would stop short of adopting a principle of desuetude that would permit
it to nullify archaic statutes in domestic cases, it seems equally inappropriate for it to permit the same result by the manufacture of transparent
foreign contacts.
144 BICKEL, THE IEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 148-56 (1962). He finds this principle incipient in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion (for four of the nine participating Justices) in Poe
v. Ullman, 367 US. 497 (1961), where the Court refused to determine the constitutionality
of Connecticut's birth control statute.
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In justification of its decision the Court of Appeals in Rosenstiel
cited Gould v. Gould,14 5 in which New York had recognized a French
divorce of New York domiciliaries. But that decision, as the court conceded, was not exactly "a clear precedent," for the French court had
applied the New York adultery statute, and a divorce based on New
York law cannot easily be said to violate New York policy. Moreover,
the court made no attempt to distinguish or to discredit its earlier
unanimous decision in Caldwell v. Caldwell,146 although two protesting
opinions considered it controlling. In Caldwell neither husband nor
wife had bothered to go to Mexico, the divorce having been granted
after attorneys had appeared in court for both parties. The court held
the divorce contrary to public policy and refused even to apply the
usual "estoppel" doctrine that precludes people from attacking divorces
they themselves have obtained. I am wholly unable to see why it is
material to New York policy whether husband and wife have spent an
hour in Juarez or not; I think the reason the court did not distinguish
Caldwell was that it was indistinguishable. The court indeed implicitly
admitted this, for it argued that Mexican divorces should be recognized
because they were no more offensive to policy than Nevada's: "[O]ur
public interest is not affected differently by a formality of one day than
by a formality of six weeks."
In an ideal world I think New York would not recognize fraudulent
Nevada divorces either. It recognizes them now because it has to, but
that does not require it to recognize Mexican divorces, which are outside the full faith and credit clause. The court seems to have been
suggesting that Nevada divorces so thoroughly vitiate New York's policy
of protecting marriage that there is no point in preserving the remains.
There is something to be said for this position, especially since a law
forbidding divorce except after six weeks in Nevada discriminates
sharply against the poor. But the same objection can be levelled against
Rosenstiel itself, for the decision does not go nearly far enough to
eliminate economic discrimination. Requiring people to make a senseless trip to Mexico, or even to hire Mexican lawyers to file suit for
them in Juarez, is completely without rational basis, serves only to
invites challenge as
limit divorce to people of means, and therefore
47
laws.1
the
of
protection
equal
of
a denial
145 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923).
146 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948).
147 Cf. Harper v. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). It can also be argued
that making foreign divorces available to the rich retards enactment of laws making local
divorces available to all, because it lessens pressure for amendment. See von Mehren, The
Validity of Foreign Divorces, 45 MAss. L.Q. 23, S5 (1960).
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The final consideration suggested by the court in defense of its
Rosenstiel decision was that "many thousands" of New Yorkers had
been affected by the consistent course of lower court decisions recognizing bilateral Mexican divorces. 148 The implication is that it would
have been unfair to people who had obtained such divorces in reliance
on the lower court decisions for the Court of Appeals to refuse recognition. Stability is certainly important in the law: the careful citizen
ought to be able to determine legal consequences with reasonable
certainty before he takes the plunge. But it seems extreme for a court
to invoke the reliance principle to foreclose examination of lower court
decisions it has never approved. It is fair to say that the Court of
Appeals ought to have taken up the issue long before in order to set
right a growing number of mistaken decisions below. But it does not
seem fair to argue that the court's failure to do so implied approval
of those decisions. For ever since Caldwell v. Caldwell149 in 1948 it
had been plain for any lawyer to see that Mexican mail-order divorces
were contrary to public policy. Since the two are indistinguishable in
principle, I do not think anyone had a right to expect the Court of
Appeals to deal differently with Mexican divorces on personal
appearance. 1 0
But if the court was unwilling to inflict the penalties of a lawyer's
incautious optimism upon his client, Chief Judge Desmond and Judge
Scileppi suggested an alternative remedy that the majority did not
deign to discuss: prospective overruling. This technique is not without
its difficulties. Chief Judge Desmond would have disapproved future
Mexican divorces without setting aside the decree in Rosenstiel. Judge
Scileppi argued that this procedure would require the court to comment on an issue not relevant to disposition of the case and would
give a party no incentive to appeal the upholding of precedent; he
preferred to set aside the divorce in the case before him, but otherwise
148 E.g., Kantrowitz v. Kantrowitz, 21 App. Div. 2d 654, 249 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1964). The
Court of Appeals cited 19 cases decided over 25 years.
149 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948).

150 Against this authority, the earlier dictum of the Court of Appeals that "it is no
part of the public policy of this State to refuse recognition to divorce decrees of foreign

states when rendered on the appearance of both parties, even when the parties go from
this State to the foreign state for the purpose of obtaining the decree and do obtain it on
grounds not recognized here," In the Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N.Y. 31, 36-37, 47
N.E.2d 681, 684 (1943), seems a weak reed. The holding in Rhinelander was a refusal to
set aside a support agreement following an ex parte divorce on the ground of public
policy. Glaser v. Glaser, 275 N.Y. 296, 12 N.E.2d 305 (1938), in which the court made
similar remarks in upholding a Nevada divorce, was based on a finding of Nevada
domicile.
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to deny the decision retroactive effect.' 5 ' Judge Scileppi's argument may
be a bit intellectually untidy, but it may offer the best alternative to
judicial paralysis on the one hand and wholesale frustration of legitimate expectations on the other. And in any case I do not think the
court was justified in allowing fears of upsetting people's past plans
o
to interfere with a correction of the law for the future.
In brief, the Rosenstiel decision left New York with a divorce law
that could satisfy nobody, and it did so at great cost to the proper
relationship between the courts and the legislature.
F. A Sequel and a Conclusion
It is headline material that the New York legislature, not long after
Rosenstiel, finally got around to amending the divorce statute. 5 2 Several
additional grounds have been provided, including cruelty, abandonment, and two years' separation pursuant to a separation agreement
or decree. The new statute will greatly alleviate, although because of
the requirement of either fault or substantial delay it will not eliminate,
the problem of foreign divorces for New Yorkers. As it now stands,
the statute represents a fairly decent balance between the severity of
chaining people to dead marriages and the irresponsibility of making
families as easy to dissolve as bouillon cubes. The unfortunate fact is
that the Sherrer and Rosenstiel decisions, if adhered to, make it next
to impossible for New York to enforce its hard-fought and careful
decision.
There is a provision in the new New York divorce statute that
attempts to limit the availability of foreign divorces. It provides, in
substance, that a person who lived in New York both shortly before
and shortly after the divorce, or who maintained a New York place
of residence. the whole time, will have an uphill job of proving he was
domiciled somewhere else at the time of the divorce. 5 s Nice try; but
151 See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 17, 27-28, 163 N.E.2d 89,
97 (1959). See generally HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCEsS 620-37 (Tent. ed. 1958). Prospective overruling of the Scileppi variety is advocated by Professor Leach in his entertamining vignette on Rosenstiel. See Leach, Divorce by Plane-Ticket-With a Side-Order
of Jurisprudence, 14 KAN. L. REV. 549, 552, 558-59 (1966).
152 N.Y. Doms. REL. LAw § 170.
153 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 250:
Divorces obtained outside the state of New York. Proof that a person obtaining
- a divorce in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this state within twelve
months prior to the commencement of the proceeding therefore, and resumed residence in this state within eighteen months after the date of his departure therefrom, or (b) at all times after his departure from this state and until his return
maintained a place of residence within this state, shall be prima facie evidence
that the person was domiciled in this state when the divorce proceeding was
commenced.
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this will be no help at all against either Sherrer or Rosenstiel. For the
former permitted colluding spouses to foreclose any effective inquiry
into domicile by both appearing in Nevada, and the latter upheld a
Mexican divorce upon the explicit hypothesis that the parties were
domiciled in New York.
One might argue that by providing a statutory test for determining
domicile the legislature indicated an intent to make domicile necessary for divorce. But there is a more persuasive reason why the
Court of Appeals ought to decline to follow Rosenstiel in future cases
under the amended statute: it can no longer be argued, as at the time
of Rosenstiel, that the statute does not express the public policy of
New York, or that it does not embody a policy in favor of preserving
marriages that do not meet its specifications for divorce. The legislature is no longer in default, and for the court to nullify its efforts
would amount not to filling a vacuum of responsibility, as in Rosenstiel
itself, but rather to open defiance. I do not think stare decisis or reliance upon Rosenstiel a serious obstacle, since Rosenstiel was decided
in an entirely different context; it could arguably be said then, but it
cannot now, that Mexican consent divorces are no affront to New York
policy.
New York courts are free to stop recognizing Mexican divorces in
violation of New York policy, but, thanks to the Supreme Court, there
is nothing they can do about Nevada divorces. 1 54 For the full faith
and credit principle that each state shall mind its own business has
broken down in divorce. Although the second Williams decision
laudably embraced that principle, the enormous temptation to collusion would make enforcement most difficult at best, and the Sherrer
line of decisions has made it impossible.
Nevada will not help; her disregard for the Constitution is deplorable,' 5 5 but it is unrealistic to expect a state to take extraordinary precautions against little white lies in order to rid itself of a gold mine.
But Congress, I think, can play a constructive role. I do not suggest
The section is taken from the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act § 2, 9 U.L.A. 457, 470
(1965). New York omits § 1, which provides that a foreign divorce of spouses domiciled in
the enacting state is entitled to no effect. The Uniform Act, with some variations, has
been enacted in ten states. See 9a U.L.A. 457 (1965). It is an adequate expression of common sense, and it should prove useful in ex parte and foreign country situations or if the
state is permitted to attack bilateral sister state decrees.
154 They may enjoin New Yorkers from suing in Nevada. See Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum,
309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955) (dictum). The case holds no injunction will be granted
against an ex parte Mexican divorce, for the divorce will be void and legal remedies adequate. But this remedy requires a New York plaintiff willing to block the divorce; it is
no answer to the problem of collusion.
155 See STUMBF., CoNfner OF LAws 303 (3d ed. 1963).
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that Congress can overrule the Court on a matter of constitutional
interpretation, but Congress has express authority to implement the
full faith and credit clause by legislation, and its conception of the
proper balance between the principles of finality and of state autonomy
is entitled to great respect. 156 I should like to see a statute forbidding
any state or territory to divorce people on grounds not recognized by
their former home jurisdiction unless one or both of the parties has
resided in the divorcing state for a substantial specified period, such
as one year. 57 This would eliminate the element of intention to
remain, thereby reducing the opportunities for cheating (intention is
a particularly safe thing to fib about, for nobody can really prove what
you were thinking). Of course, the lack of adversaries makes it possible
to concoct a false case of twelve months' stay in Nevada too, and if
this were the easiest way to get a divorce it might well become standard
practice. But Congress could make this somewhat less likely by declaring that any divorce obtained in violation of the residence requirement
would be wholly void and subject to attack by any interested person
at any time. No legislation can wholly prevent lying about residence
to obtain a paper divorce, just as no legislation can prevent people
from establishing and dissolving family relationships without formalities. But there are a great many people who go to great lengths to
avoid the latter alternative because they are unwilling to ignore the
law completely.
III.

DIVORCE AS AN INCIDENTAL QUESTION:

Borax v. Commissioner
Husband: 1. obs: husbandman [one that plows and cultivates land) 2a: a married
man . . . b: a man who on the basis of his tribal or societal institutions is considered to be married . . . 3a archaic: the manager of another's property . . .
4: one that uses thriftily or saves for future use.
N. Webster
156 See Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 371, 388 (1933);
Mayers, Ex parte Divorce: A Proposed Federal Remedy, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 54, 59-60
(1954), arguing that under this power Congress may overrule Williams 1; cf. The Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), where the Supreme Court altered its
view of the constitutional limits of admiralty jurisdiction in response to a statute, even in
the absence of explicit congressional interpretative power; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966) (fourteenth amendment); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966) (fifteenth amendment).
157 See LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTIcLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 424-25 (1947). Probably
some requirement of presence in the state ought to be added, although it might be
difficult to administer, in order to forestall proof of "residence" by absentee ownership.
And special provision should be made to assure a "home" to people who never live a year
in the same place.
The Uniform Annulment of Marriage and Divorce Act of 1907 would have forbidden
divorce except for adultery or bigamy unless one of the parties had resided in the state
for two years. It was adopted by only three states. See 1 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 414-15
& n.4, 438, 495-96 (2d ed. 1958), advocating such a requirement.
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The final saga in this trilogy is the interesting tale of Herman Borax.
Herman and his wife Ruth were New Yorkers, but one fine day
Herman trotted off without her to Chihuahua and returned with a
divorce and a new wife, the latter alliteratively named Hermine. Ex
parte Mexican divorces are too much for even New York courts to
stomach, and Ruth obtained a declaration that the divorce was invalid.
Herman and Hermine were not a bit flustered. They went right on
filing joint tax returns on his income, taking dependency exemptions
for her children and parents, and deducting alimony paid to Ruth.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however, took umbrage. The
first two of these tax-saving devices, he thought, were available only
to husbands and wives, and the last only to men validly divorced;
Herman and Hermine, he maintained, did not fill these bills. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed: although every court in
the country would be required to respect the New York judgment
holding the divorce invalid,1 8 Herman was effectively divorced from
Ruth and married to Hermine for federal tax purposes.'6 9 Judge
Friendly dissented. 6 0
It is a common consequence of laws restricting marriage and divorce
that people who have lived for years as man and wife are denied
benefits such as social security,' 61 workmen's compensation 62 and
recovery for wrongful death. 63 For the courts often construe statutes
speaking of the "widow" or "surviving spouse" to refer only to lawful
marriages; a defective marriage or divorce in the pedigree means no
compensation for the loss of support. Borax is illustrative of the difficulties engendered in other areas by the sad state of American divorce
law, and it demonstrates the fallibility of the assumption that such
statutory terms as "husband and wife" invariably require a tedious
investigation into the legality of a marriage.
A. Alimony

In 1917 the Supreme Court held that alimony received by a divorcee
was not taxable as her income, in part because the husband was not
entitled to a deduction for paying it.164 Congress reacted to this in
1942 by making some alimony payments taxable to the wife and deducti:158 Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952).

159 349 F.2d 666 (1965); accord, Wondsel v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965)

(1954 Code).
160
161
162
163
164

349 F.2d at 676-77.
E.g., Di Giovanni v. Ribicoff, 288 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
E.g., Mainor v. Midvale Co., 192 Pa. Super. 367, 162 A.2d 27 (1960).
E.g., Beebe v. Moormack Lines, 59 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1932).
Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
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ble by the husband, 165 the hope being to place the burden on "the
spouse actually receiving or actually entitled to receive" the money
rather than on the husband, who, especially in light of the increased
rate of tax during wartime, often "would not have sufficient income
left after paying alimony to meet his income tax obligations."' 6 6
The committee reports underscored, however, the statute's clear
requirement that there be "a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance," and the courts consequently denied that alimony paid pursuant
to separation agreements in the absence of a court decree were deductible. 167 The reports suggest no reason for this limitation; some have
surmised that Congress was deterred from including support payments
not related to decrees because of "the possibility of income tax evasion and the difficulty of disproving the bona fides of an informal
separation."'16
Herman Borax was paying alimony, and he had a Mexican divorce
decree; but the divorce had been declared null by a New York court. 169
The Tax Court had earlier held that a Mexican divorce that Mexico
had set aside did not quilify, 10 and in Borax it held the same reasoning
applicable.171 But the Second Circuit in reversing was not the first to
hold that an invalid divorce is sufficient to shift the tax burden to the
wife. The Third Circuit in Feinberg v. Commissioner had allowed a

husband to deduct alimony payments although his wife had had his
165 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §§ 22(k), 23(u); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71, 215.
166 Lerner v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 296, 298 (2d Cir. 1952); H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 71-72 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-84 (1942). There
was also concern because income from some alimony trusts was taxable to the wife and
income from others to the husband. See SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
1094 (1960); Gornick, Alimony and the Income Tax, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 28, 29-36 (1943).
167 E.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1948); Charles L. Brown, 7 T.C.
715 (1946).
168 Smith v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir. 1948); G.C.M. 25250, 1947-2
Cum. BULL. 32, 33; Gornick, supra #note 166, at 40. After adoption of the split-income
provision for husbands and wives in 1948, the danger of sham separation agreements in
order to lower tax rates disappeared, and Congress extended the section to tax wives on
alimony paid under a written agreement or a support decree as well, INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 71, 215; see Mavity v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1965); SURREY &
WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1098 (1960), because "a voluntary separation is as
deserving of this type of treatment as is a separation by court decree." Mavity v. Commissioner, supra, at 870; see S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
169 There had also been a New York decree reforming the amount payable under
a separation agreement, but the Tax Court had held this was not a decree of "separate
maintenance" because no grounds for a separation had been alleged and because New
York refuses decrees to people who have separated by contract. The decree, the Tax Court
said, must be one altering the marital status. Herman Borax, 30 T.C. 817 (1958).
170 Estate of Daniel Buckley, 37 T.C. 664 (1962).
171 Ruth Borax, 40 T.C. 1001 (1963).
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ex parte divorce set aside: "The mere fact that the marital domicile
of the parties did not recognize the Florida divorce does not render
it a nullity for federal income tax purposes.'

2

And in so holding the

Third Circuit relied upon a 1947 memorandum from the General
Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, which declared that alimony
was deductible even if a foreign divorce would probably be struck
down by the home state."73
The Tax Court in Borax thought both the General Counsel's
memorandum and Feinberg distinguishable. The General Counsel,
said the Tax Court, based his ruling "primarily upon the fact that
both parties had relied in good faith on the validity of the Mexican
divorce." The Third Circuit opinion in turn relied heavily on the
General Counsel's ruling, so that court too "must therefore have felt
that both parties were relying in good faith on the Florida divorce
decree, which we do not find to be the situation here." The Tax Court
concluded that "the statute contemplates a decree of divorce which
creates a valid status of divorce between the parties or at least a decree
upon which both parties in good faith rely."
It is true that the General Counsel's opinion was influenced by his
finding that both parties had relied upon the divorce in good faith.
But it is hardly fair to say the same of Feinberg:the wife in that case,
like Ruth Borax, had not relied upon the divorce at all, but had had
it set aside. Moreover, the General Counsel gave an additional reason
for allowing the deduction. The reason for requiring a decree at all
is to prevent sham arrangements designed to avoid taxes; this policy
is satisfied by a void decree because "even though a husband and wife
might execute a separation agreement as an income-splitting device, it
is doubtful that a husband and wife would go through the form of a
Mexican divorce for such purpose."
Allowing Herman to deduct alimony served the legislative policy
of taxing the person enjoying income; the language of the decree
requirement was satisfied, as there was in fact a "divorce decree"; and
if the General Counsel's assessment is correct, the purpose of the requirement was satisfied as well. Moreover, the Second Circuit's decision, unlike that of the Tax Court, is in accord with Congress' apparent
reluctance to require ticklish determinations of good faith in each case;
it also promotes the same policy by avoiding the troublesome inquiry
into the validity of foreign divorces. Finally, if good faith in the particular case is to be the test, as the Tax Court has suggested, the purpose
172
'3

198 F.2d 260, 263 (1952).
G.C.M. 25250, 1947-2 CuM. BuLL. 82.
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of the decree requirement is quite clearly met here. The dissolution
was plainly no sham, since Ruth attacked the decree and Herman
took up with another woman. Therefore, it seems wholly consonant
with the policy of the alimony provision to hold that "divorce" does
not refer to marital status under state law."74
B. The Joint Return

The privilege of filing a joint return affords a considerable tax break
to many a "husband and wife," for they may minimize the effect of
progressive rates by paying twice the tax that would be charged on
half their combined incomes. 175 The Code contains an incomplete
definition: "An individual who is legally separated from his spouse
under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance shall not be considered as married.'

178

The Tax Court has consistently held that

"husband and wife" are those who are legally married under state
law, unless separated by a court decree; 177 and the Regulations allow
joint returns by spouses who do not live together or who have obtained
an interlocutory divorce. 7 8
The split-income provision was enacted in 1948 for the stated purpose of eliminating the inequitable advantage that prior law had
afforded to couples living in community-property states. 79 Earlier the
Supreme Court had held that because a husband's earnings under the
community system belonged half to his wife, half should be treated
174 The argument in an earlier section of this paper suggests that to impose tax upon a
wife on the basis of an ex parte divorce may deprive her of property without due process of
law. See Part I supra; cf. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957). This argument was
rejected by Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965).
175 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 12(d); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2(a).
176 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 51(b)(5)(B); INT. REy. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(d).
177 E.g., John J. Untermann, 38 T.C. 93 (1962); Albert Gersten, 28 T.C. 756 (1957), affd
on this issue, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959); Marriner S. Eccles, 19 T.C. 1049, aff'd per curiam,
208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953).
178 Treas. Reg. § 1.60134(a) (1965). If the statutory requirement relates to the finality of
family breakdown it may be rational to distinguish between interlocutory divorces and
decrees of separate maintenance: "An interlocutory decree under [Colorado law] . . . is
intended to encourage a reunion of the parties-a healing of the breach-a period during
which the parties may become reconciled; while separate maintenance ... is intended to
effect a permanent status-a final divorce from bed and board." Commissioner v. Evans, 211
F.2d 378, 380 (10th Cir. 1954), refusing to tax a wife on alimony incident to an interlocutory
divorce.
179 See Hofferbert v. Marshall, 200 F.2d 648, 650 (4th Cir. 1952); H.R. REP. No. 1274,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1948); Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act
of 1948, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1103-06 (1948). There was also concern because of confusion and inequality caused by attempts to split income by agreement in common law
states, attempts that were more successful with investment income than with earned income.
See BITrER, F.DEAL INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFr TAXATION 280-82 (2d ed. 1958).
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as her income; 80 with progressive tax rates, it was reckoned that spouses
whose income consisted of the husband's $25,000 salary paid forty per
cent more taxes if their state did not recognize community property.' 8 '
Such states as Pennsylvania and Michigan suddenly perceived the
virtues of the community-property system, 8 2 and Congress reacted by
extending the benefits of divided income to husbands and wives in
every state.
The congressional policy of equal treatment does not carry us very
far toward determining who is entitled to file a joint return. Since
the purpose of the provision was to afford all taxpayers the incomesplitting benefits already available in community-property states, it
might seem plausible to define "husband and wife" as those people
who could have split their income in a community-property statethat is, those whose earnings would have been community property.18 3

This test is unworkable, however, because the community-property
states differ among themselves in determining when a community
exists. 184 But, significantly, it is clear that such a definition would not
limit the joint return to lawful spouses, since the community states

give a full portion to the person who mistakenly believes himself
married.8 5
180 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
181 See H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1948).
182 See Brrrmm, supra note 179, at 280.
183 See Commissioner v. Stockly, 221 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1955): "Since it already was
lawful for a married couple in a community property state to split any longterm income
which they allocated to prior years under Section 107(a), the purpose of Section 12(d) is
effectuated by permitting the same procedure in a case such as we have before us." See also
18 STAN. L. REv. 750, 754 (1966).
184 In California, for example, if a wife abandons her husband the earnings of both are
separate property. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 169, 175; see Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 342,
48 P. 228, 229 (1897). In New Mexico, absent a separation decree, they are community.
See N.M. STATs. § 57-3-7 (1953); Loveridge v. Loveridge, 52 N.M. 353, 198 P.2d 444 (1948);
CLARK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND THE FAMILY IN NEW MExico 19 (1956). Moreover, it is
clear that Congress did not choose to tie income-splitting to the cumbersome process of
classifying property as separate or community, for the committee reports are explicit
that the advantages of the joint return extend to separate income as well as to community. H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1948); S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong.
2d Sess. 24 (1948).
185 Whether Herman and Hermine's earnings would have been community property depends upon whether they honestiy believed they were married. See, e.g.,
Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal.2d 681, 684, 134 P.2d 761, 762 (1943). There is no assurance that all eight community-property states would agree as to the bone fides of
their belief. In Louisiana it has been said that there is a putative marriage, and thus
community property, if the parties had no "certain knowledge" of an impediment to
marriage, Howard v. Ingle, 180 So. 248, 252 (La. App. 1938); in California it has been said
that there must be "a diligent attempt to meet the requisites of a valid marriage," Miller
v. Johnson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 123, 126, 29 Cal. Rptr. 251, 253 (1963), and that in most cases
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Geographical equality could alternatively have been achieved by
taxing the earner rather than the owner of income.18 6 But implicit in
the proposal for joint returns was the view that the family constituted
an economic unit, that all husbands and wives with equal total income
ought to be taxed equally because it is economically immaterial whether
the money is earned or owned by one or by both spouses. 87 Judged
by this policy, the Second Circuit's decision in Borax makes very good
sense. Herman and Hermine were living together as man and wife,
and they were no less an economic unit because he had not been lawfully divorced. Indeed, if "husband and wife" mean lawful spouses,
a man may file joint returns with his first wife after he has illegally
cast her off and taken up with another-a procedure in very poor
accord with the policy of treating economic units as taxable ones.',,
Neither geographical equality nor treatment of the family as a taxable unit required giving husband and wife the advantage of reduced
tax rates; one unsuccessful bill with both these purposes would have
taxed their aggregate income at the same rate as if it had been earned
by a single individual' 8 9 Congress seems never really to have decided
that married couples are deserving of special treatment. Rather, confronted by a tax advantage in community-property states, it achieved
in which a de facto wife has been awarded a community share "the marriage proved
invalid only because of some essential fact of which she was unaware," Vallera v. Vallera,
21 Cal. 2d 681, 684, 134 P.2d 761, 762 (1943). In Texas a marriage ceremony is required for
a putative marriage, In re Greathouse's Estate, 184 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); in
California it is not, Santos v. Santos, 82 Cal. App. 62, 89 P.2d 164 (1939).
In Miller v. Johnson, supra, the court refused a community share to a woman who had
secured a unilateral "divorce" from a Tijuana "office" which had a sign on the door,
"Divorces and Marriages." Whether Hermine could be found honestly to have believed
Herman free to marry is debatable. She married him in Juarez in August 1952, two
weeks after he had obtained a unilateral Juarez court divorce that was dearly invalid
in New York. Imbrioscia v. Quayle, 303 N.Y. 841, 104 N.E.2d 378 (1952). The extent of her
knowledge of the particulars of his divorce is not reported.
186 See TREAsutY DE1rT. STiDY, Tim TAX TREATMENT OF FAMILY INCOME (1947), Hearings
Before House Comm. on Ways & Means on Revenue Revisions, 1947-48, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 844 (1947), in SuRREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1052-53 (1960),
detailing the history of proposals to tax community-property income to the spouse who
manages and controls it.
187 See TREASURY DEPT. STUDY, supra note 186, in BiTrKER, FEDERAL INCOME, EsTATE &
GIr-T TAXATION 280, 281 (1958); Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue
Act of 1948, 61 Hxav. L. Rav. 1097, 1114 (1948).
188 Yet one court has implied that he may. See Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195,
200 (9th Cir. 1959), holding, contrary to Borax, that he may not file jointly with the
second wife. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-4(a) (1965): "[TMhe mere fact that spouses have
not lived together during the course of the taxable year shall not prohibit them from
making a joint return."
189 See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), in SuRRaY & WARREN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 1054-56 (1960).
1
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equality by giving all spouses the same advantage because it was politically more feasible to reduce taxes than to raise them. 190 But, arguably,
it is the job of the courts to make sense out of statutes, and it may not
always be amiss to look beyond legislative history for policy considerations capable of aiding in interpretation. The joint return has been
defended on the ground that a married man deserves to pay lower
taxes than a single man with the same income because his expenses
are greater; the splitting of income is said to compensate for the inadequacy of the present system of personal exemptions in reflecting this
disparity in the middle-income brackets. 191 If, despite Congress' preoccupation in 1948 with community property, the split-income provision can be seen as implementing a policy of taxation according to
ability to pay, legal marriage is unnecessary; the man with a woman and
six kids to support is no better able to pay high taxes just because he
is not lawfully married.
To define "husband and wife" as lawful spouses, therefore, would
be inconsistent with the avowed legislative purpose of eliminating the
discriminatory effect of community property, with the underlying
assumption that the family is an economic unit, and with the plausible
suggestion that husband and wife deserve a tax break because of their
high cost of living. These considerations suggest that spouses who have
permanently separated ought not to be allowed to file jointly and that
people who live together without being technically married ought to
be. Several objections, however, might be raised against defining
"husband and wife" to mean a man and woman who maintain a
common household. The most serious of these are that such a definition would contravene the policy of the state marriage laws and that it
would be difficult to administer.
As the experience of Selective Service has recently demonstrated, one
190 See the discussion of legislative history in Surrey, supra note 187, at 1105.
191 See Pechman, Income Splitting, in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONG.,
IsT SEss., I TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 473 (1959), reprinted in SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 1069-72 (1960), suggesting this and other justifications for split income
and finding all wanting; BITrKER, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE & GIr TAXATION 280-88 (1958),
considering income splitting and dependency exemptions in the context of ability to pay.
Congress recognized the relevance of this policy of taxation according to ability to pay when
it extended partial benefits of income splitting to unmarried "heads of households" in 1951
because in such cases income "is likely to be shared with the child to the extent necessary
to maintain the home, and raise and educate the child." H.R. REP. No. 586, 82nd Cong.,
Ist Sess. 11 (1951). Further, "the hardship appears particularly severe in the case of the
individual with children to raise who, upon the death of his spouse, finds himself in the
position not only of being denied the spouse's aid in raising the children, but under
present law also may find his tax load heavier." Ibid. See Pechman, Individual Income Tax
Provisions of the 1954 Code, 8 NAT'L TAX J. 114, 126-31 (1955).
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effect of conferring special benefits on married couples is to make
marriage more attractive. If it is fair to attribute to the split-income
provision a purpose to encourage marriage, 19 2 presumably "husband
and wife" are the legally married. Short of this, it is arguable that
people who have obtained invalid divorces ought to be denied the
joint return in order to bolster the otherwise ineffective enforcement
of strict divorce laws. Finally, to give tax advantages to men and women
living together illicitly might tend to encourage relationships forbidden
by state law; 193 it is in recognition of the undesirability of construing
the tax code to frustrate state policy that the Supreme Court has disallowed business-expense deductions for criminal fines' 94 and that the
Tax Court has refused to allow exemptions for dependents with whom
95
the taxpayer is living unlawfully.
Several replies can be offered. First, the policy of taxing man and
wife as an economic unit, which would be frustrated by a test of legal
marriage, can be more closely identified with actual legislative intention than can a policy of encouraging marriage. Second, denial of the
joint return may impose a considerable hardship on people who
honestly believe they are married, especially if taxes for past years are
in question; this hardship may be wholly disproportionate to the
offense for which they are to be punished. Third, it is difficult to
believe that denial of the joint return will be of much efficacy in
eliminating illegal divorces. One suspects that regardless of the federal
tax laws, people will go right on traveling to Juarez so long as the trip
makes bigamy tolerable to the conscience. 96 In addition, the Supreme
192 Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170 (deduction for charitable contributions). See S. REP.
No. 1584, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952), justifying an increase in the maximum allowable
deduction: "Your committee believes that it is to the best interest of the community to
encourage private contributions to these institutions and it is believed that this amendment
will provide some assistance in this respect."
193 See 52 VA. L. REv. 141, 148-49 (1966).
194 Tank Truck Rentals Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
'95 E.g. Leon Turnipseed, 27 T.C. 758 (1957). Congress has since written this decision
into the statute, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 152(b)(5), specifically to exclude an exemption
for "an individual who is a 'common-law wife' where the applicable State law does not
recognize common-law marriages." H.R. REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1957). This
amendment argues powerfully for disallowance of the joint return under present law,
and it may not be improper to consider it as bearing on the interpretation of prior law as
well. See Comment, State Domestic Relations Law and Federal Tax Policy, 66 CoLum.
L. R v. 150, 164-65 (1966), criticizing on this ground Borax and especially its companion
case Wondsel, which arose under the 1954 Code and which allowed an exemption for an
illegal "spouse." The comment doubts the wisdom of § 152(b)(5).
196 See Comment, supra note 195, 66 COLuM. L. REv. at 155-56 (1966), arguing that
"domestic relations involve too many personal factors for tax results to be legitimately
considered the sine qua non of action," and that in this area a tax decision may have no
substantial effect on state policy.
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Court has emphasized that the income tax is "a tax on net income, not
a sanction against wrongdoing,' 197 with exceptions only if the threat to
state policy is direct and immediate. 98 To have allowed deduction of
criminal fines would have been substantially to dilute the punishment.
On the other hand, although some people who are unable to marry
might enter into illicit relationships in order to split their incomes,
the affront to state policy is at least less glaring. 99
The second substantial argument against defining "husband and
wife" as those who live together is the difficulty of administration. Not
every transient liaison constitutes an economic unit, and not every
couple with separate addresses represents a dead marriage. Further,
although it would not be without precedent,20 0 a test in terms of intention to establish a permanent relationship would require a slippery
factual inquiry. But the desirability of a simple test does not suggest
that "husband and wife" should mean lawful spouses. In the first place,
a written separation agreement is quite as lucid a benchmark of the
broken marriage as is a court decree, and it comports better with the
policy of taxing the family as a unit.201 Moreover, and more important,
Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966).
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 556 U.S. 30, 35 (1958).
199 One latter-day rationalization for the split-income provision is that to tax married
couples as if one spouse had earned the total would make a man and a woman with equal
incomes pay more tax after marriage than before. See Pechman, supra note 191, in SURREY
& WAMRMN, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATiON 1070 (1960). This tells us only that "husband and
wife" are those people who would have been required to aggregate their incomes had
Congress adopted a different solution to the community-property problem. The best
argument that can be drawn from this is that to require only legal spouses to aggregate
income might have encouraged illegal arrangements; since the premise is that "husband
and wife" who may split income are the same "husband and wife" who would hypothetically have been required to pay additional taxes, this argument somewhat undercuts
the suggestion that the split-income provision should be limited to lawful spouses in order
to encourage marriage.
200 A House committee in 1941 proposed a bill requiring joint returns, without a break
in rates, for husbands and wives who "have not separated with intent to abandon
permanently the marital relationship." See H.R. RaP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., in
Suimqy & WAUEN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 1054 (1960). This is also the test employed
in California to determine when a wife's earnings are separate property because she is living
"separate and apart from" her husband. Makeig v. United Security Bank & Trust Co., 112
Cal. App. 138, 296 Pac. 673 (1931).
201 However, negative inference from the provision that spouses separated under "a
decree of divorce or of separate maintenance" are not "husband and wife" probably requires allowance of joint returns despite a separation agreement, for this definition was
taken from the alimony provision with the direction that it be uniformly construed
in all applications, see S. RE,. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1948), and alimony
deductions without a court decree were clearly forbidden. See p. 66 supra. Uniform construction here promotes simplicity, but it is unfortunate in terms of substantive policy.
Insistence on a decree prevents fraudulent agreements designed to obtain alimony
deductions, but it makes no sense in income-splitting, because nobody would drum up a
197
198
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the legality of a marriage often depends upon the past intention of
one of the parties to continue living in the state that granted him an
earlier divorce, and proof of that intention seems just as elusive and
tedious as proof of an intention to establish a permanent man-and-wife
relationship.
Finally, as Judge Marshall indicated, the Second Circuit decision in
Borax draws support from the legislative direction that a "decree of
divorce" sufficient to permit alimony deductions should also dissolve
a marriage for purposes of the joint return,2 0 2 since, as I have suggested
above, the decree in Borax seems to satisfy the alimony provision. 20 3
Significantly, both opinions in Borax rejected the Tax Court's position that only those legally married may file joint returns. Judge
Marshall thought legality irrelevant to tax policy; Judge Friendly,
believing that Congress did not intend that the Commissioner and
the courts "should set themselves up as domestic relations tribunals,"
would have allowed the return if New York had not already declared
the divorce null. Both opinions suggest simple tests that avoid embroiling the courts and the taxpayers in the uncertainties and complexities
of the law of foreign divorce: Judge Friendly would accept any divorce
that has not been set aside, and Judge Marshall apparently would
accept any divorce at all.204 The simplicity of both tests is consistent

with the general policy of certainty in the tax law, and neither the
language nor the purpose of the statute seems to compel the sacrifice
of this policy to a test based on the legality of the marriage.20 5
false separation in order to lose the benefit of the joint return. It makes even less sense
now that a decree is no longer required for alimony deductions, yet § 71 of the 1954
Code clearly contemplates that separated spouses may file joint returns.
202 See note 201 supra.
203 See p. 67 supra. The joint return was not a new idea in 1948; prior law had allowed
"a husband and wife living together" to file a joint return, aggregating their incomes and

deductions, without the benefit of reduced rates. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 51(b).
The committee reports suggest no reason for eliminating the words "living together"
when the split-income provision was adopted, and the omission is consistent with
inadvertence or with a belief that the words were redundant, as well as with an intention

to change the law. The earlier provision may also be based on the premise that husband
and wife are an economic unit, and decisions construing it, or its legislative history, might
prove helpful.
204 At least if it is not "totally alien" to the foncept of divorce in the tax law and if it
has not been set aside by the divorcing court itself, see Estate of Daniel Buckley, 37 T.C.
664 (1962), which refused to give such a divorce effect under the alimony provisions.
The Borax opinion left the effect of such decrees open.
205 Judge Friendly's collateral estoppel argument is not unanswerable. It assumes that
the issue in the tax case was the same as the issue in Mrs. Borax' suit to annul the divorce,
and this in turn depends upon the view that "husband and wife" refers to marital status
under state law-a view that the court rejected.
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C. The Dependency Exemptions
From 1944 to 1954 the tax code allowed exemptions only for dependents who were within prescribed degrees of relationship by blood,
marriage, or adoption. Among the acceptable classes were a "stepson
or stepdaughter," a "father-in-law," and a "mother-in-law" of the taxpayer.2 6 The Second Circuit allowed Herman Borax exemptions for
Hermine's parents and for her children by a prior marriage, although
Herman and Hermine were not legally married.
The Tax Court's position was that nobody has a "mother-in-law"
unless he is legally married.220 Had Herman and Hermine filed separate
returns, it would have been necessary to ask why Congress inaugurated
in 1944 a policy of limiting exemptions to persons related to the taxpayer, and on this the committee reports give no assistance. 208 But at
all relevant times the Regulations provided that in the case of a joint
return the dependent need not be related to the spouse who provides
support: "It is sufficient if the prescribed relationship exists with
respect to either spouse." 20 9 Thus, the Second Circuit was correct in
allowing Herman Borax exemptions for Hermine's parents and children if it was right in allowing the joint return-and I have indicated
above that I believe there is strong support for that holding.
D. Conclusion
Whether the Second Circuit was right or wrong in allowing Herman
and Hermine Borax the tax advantages of marriage despite the invalidity of his Mexican divorce is a difficult question for tax experts
to resolve. What is important for our purposes is that the question
is indeed basically one of tax law, not of conflicts. The ultimate
issue is whether Herman and Hermine owed the Government more
tax dollars; the validity of the divorce is relevant only if the tax
statute is construed to make the contested tax benefits dependent
upon legal marriage.210 Whether right or wrong, Borax is a healthy
decision from the point of view of the conflict of laws, for the court
recognizes that statutory terms such as "husband and wife" do not
necessarily require a determination of the validity of foreign divorce.
206 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 25(b)(3).
207 Estate of Daniel Buckley, 37 T.C. 664, 673 (1962).
208 See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); S. R.E. No. 885, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1944).
'09 Treas. Reg. § 29.25-3(d)(5) (1949); § 39.25-2(e) (1953); § 1.152-2(d) (1965).
210 See generally the excellent Comment, supra note 195, 66 CoLua. L. Rnv. at 150-53
(1966).
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CONCLUSION

As the Great Firewater Experiment demonstrated, a law that outlaws
what a great many honest people believe is necessary or desirable cannot
be enforced. A divorce law that condemns people to the choice between
lifelong celibacy and crime because of a past mistake is not one that
people are likely to abide by.211 So long as divorce is permitted on any
ground, it will prove impossible to ferret out all instances of collusion
in the home courts. So long as a Reno or a Juarez can be found to issue
scraps of paper declaring foreign marriages dissolved, laws will be
unable to plug the dikes. And if all jurisdictions were suddenly to
abolish divorce, people would simply change partners without formality, as many of the poor do now. Not only does prohibiting divorce
fail to eliminate it; prohibition is a far less effective means of preserving
families than a more realistic divorce law coupled with such devices
as reasonable delays and marriage counseling to save those marriages
which are not beyond repair.
The considerations developed in this article furnish an additional
argument against the perpetuation of strict divorce laws. The practice
of foreign divorce often creates uncertainty and hardship; it puts severe
strains on our system for accommodating conflicting state interests;
and it breeds disrespect for the law. These disadvantages are illustrated
by Simons v. Miami Beach FirstNational Bank, which permits a wife
to be deprived of a fat slice of her husband's estate by a judicial proceeding in which she had no fair opportunity to participate; by the
Rosenstiel and Sherrer decisions, which expose the law to ridicule
for its irrationality, distort the relationship between courts and legislature, and present the spectacle of a federation in which the states are
powerless to enforce their own laws; and by the Tax Court's opinion
in Borax, which would have denied a man and woman advantages for
which they appeared qualified in terms of tax policy-all because of
the necessity for foreign divorces.
One is tempted to explain some of the Supreme Court's decisions
allowing migratory divorce as expressions of the social desirability of
providing an escape hatch for people who have the misfortune to live
under intolerably strict divorce laws. 21 2 If these laws are wholly unreasonable, the Court could strike them down under the due process
clause. This prospect seems quite improbable, however both because
211 See Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 335, 346
(1935).
212 Cf. Lorenzen's most unfortunate remark: "Approval of the decision in Williams v. North Carolina II depends in the first place upon one's personal reaction to
divorce." LORENZEN, SF.LECrED ARTICTLS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 403 (1947).

1966]

Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws

the Court is reluctant to risk getting burned again by invoking substantive due process and because rational arguments can be made that
statutes limiting divorce protect the integrity of the family. Short of
unconstitutionality, it is the Court's business to accommodate state
interests, not to frustrate them; nothing in the Constitution or in any
proper theory of judicial and legislative powers gives the Court
authority to create national divorce policy.213 Judicial nullification of
restrictive divorce laws might alleviate considerable hardship in the
short run, but it could only serve to weaken our institutions in the
214
end.
New York has shown the way to improve this sorry situation by
adopting its highly sensible new divorce law. It would not be surprising, however, if some states were to decline to follow suit. Therefore,
I think a strong argument can be made that the integrity of our federal
system, and perhaps of our legal system as a whole, demands a national
law of divorce. The prospect ought to excite no clamor over the invasion of states' rights: the states do not make their own divorce laws
now, and it surely must be less offensive in a nation based on representative government that Congress make divorce laws for the whole
country than that Nevada make them. It would be stretching the
present powers of Congress to enact a divorce law, and I do not predict that the Constitution will be soon amended to authorize one. But
until all the states see the light or divorce becomes a national subject,
the conflict of laws respecting divorce will be a perpetual eyesore.
213 See VON MEHREN

& TRAUTMAN,

THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS,

1487, 1490, 1526

(1965).
214 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
1, 10-16 (1959).
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